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Abstract
This paper argues for the importance of scale, management and sovereign-led
development in considering a more human-centric model for Third World development.
It begins by reviewing the history of the mainstream Western development model
through the evolution of modernization theory and foreign aid. It explores general
critiques of this model offered by scholars, focusing on unequal power relations, the high
cost of aid, and problems with ‘cookie cutter’ style development projects that don’t take
into account disparate environments. As the paper progresses, focus shifts more
specifically to hydropower development and ‘Big Dams’. Nepal is the main case study
for exemplifying the problems with foreign-aid-funded dam projects and for proposing
the alternative model of smaller scale, management-focused, nation-led development
projects. While the scope of this study is limited, the growing success of these projects in
Nepal suggests that more focus should be paid to applying these methods in other
developing countries.
Chapter I: Introduction
“For some time past…I have been beginning to think that we are suffering from what we
may call ‘the disease of gigantism.’ We want to show that we can build big dams and do
big things. This is a dangerous outlook developing in India… the idea of big- having big
undertakings and doing big things for the sake of showing that we can do big things- is
not a good outlook at all… It is… the small irrigation projects, the small industries and
the small plants for electric power, which will change the face of the country far more
than half a dozen big projects in half a dozen places.”
– Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India

One of the first things visitors to Kathmandu see on a trip into the crowded capital
city of Nepal is a sign, visually shouting “WELCOME TO YOU IN THE LAND OF
CONTRAST.” What an accurate description for a country the size of California,
squashed in between the two most populous countries in the world, India and China.
Nepal’s relative development stagnancy lies in sharp contrast to the industrialized
metropolises and growing global power in these two countries. Zooming in on the
country itself, independent of its powerful neighbors, reveals a nation filled with its own
stark contrasts in abounding cultural diversity, varied topography and political upheavals.

Berry

4

In the narrow span of 124 miles, Nepal drops from the sheer faces of the Himalayas to the
subtropical forests and grasslands of the sun-baked Tarai to the South. Glacial rivers
crash through steep canyons in the hilly regions between the Tarai and the mountains.
Torrents of icy water signal a seemingly endless supply of water from the glaciers and
peaks above. Yet, rivers from the same sources turn into turbid trickles of trash-choked
muck in the populous city of Kathmandu.
Nepal’s seasonal monsoon brings a cleansing influx of water to these rivers for about
four months each summer, washing away the buildup of filth. During the dry seasoneight months of perpetual drought- the rush of glacial water coursing through the
mountain rivers is frustratingly close and yet unattainable for the thirsty cities and
farmers in the parched Tarai plains. The high cost and technology necessary to pump
water to the cities and dry plains requires dams and reservoirs that Nepal has struggled
and failed to build over the last century since the introduction of hydropower. Dipak
Gyawali, a former minister of water resources in the Nepali cabinet, believes that the
popular idea that Nepal is second in the world in terms of water resources is hogwash, to
put it mildly (D. Gyawali, Interview, May 2011). The UN actually listed Nepal around
70th in the world in terms of water resources (D. Gyawali, Interview, May 2011; A. Dixit,
Interview, May 2011; R. Shrestha, Interview, May 2011), considering that four months of
floods and eight months of drought don’t make a country rich in water. Gyawali’s
comparison: “one foot in the stove and one in an ice bucket won’t keep a person
comfortable” (D. Gyawali, Interview, May 2011). The problem is in the cyclic pattern of
extreme abundance and scarcity: unless water can be stored in times of plenty, the
country will continue to suffer from lack of clean water and reliable electricity.
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A puzzling contradiction reveals itself in Nepal’s apparently bountiful supply of
glacial and monsoon water versus the observed scarcity during the lengthy dry season.
The rushing rivers I saw in the mountains while studying abroad in Nepal in 2011, along
with popular talk of Nepal’s wealth of water, contrasted strikingly with what I observed
of the almost total lack of rural infrastructure for regulated water. For most of the spring I
watched the city rivers of Kathmandu fill up with trash until I could no longer see any
water. Every day, Kathmandu has planned electricity blackouts called ‘loadshedding’
because of the scant supply of hydro-powered electricity during the dry season. Due to
this paradox, one of the most high profile issues during the last two decades of frequent
political turmoil in Nepal has been the topic of hydropower development as the key to
boosting the country out of poverty.
When people are going thirsty in a country with abundant natural water resources, the
popular solution in our modernized world is ‘development’. According to the Western
model of development, the primary solution to all water resource problems is to build Big
Dams. Big Dams are a Big solution for a Big problem. With a Big Dam, reservoirs can
provide adequate water to scores of people, even in times of drought. The concept makes
sense at a superficial level, considering that one in every six people on Earth lives
without access to adequate freshwater. But the development mantra to “just build Big,”
comes with a host of consequences that are not a worthy means to the end of Third World
Development. Simply building Big will not raise living standards in developing countries
or boost their economies to First World industrialized status. Big Dam development does
not even achieve its original goal of providing clean water to the estimated 894 million
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people in the world who lack access. (UN Water Statistics: Graphs and Maps n.d.) The
limits and challenges of effective dam projects will be a central focus of this thesis.
Big Dams might still seem like the perfect solution for a country like Nepal- with
plenty of water resources, only lacking the means to harness it. Almost 18 million people
in Nepal (60 percent of the population) live without access to electricity (D. Gyawali,
Interview, May 2011; A. Dixit, Interview, May 2011) despite seemingly plentiful water
resources in Himalayan rivers. Even worse, 95 percent of the population has no irrigation
(which would require regulated water flow from storage projects) and 75 percent of
Nepalis have no electricity that boosts industrialization, leaving only about 25 percent of
the population connected to the national grid (D. Gyawali, Interview, May 2011).
Why would anyone, therefore, object to developing as many dams as possible, by any
means necessary? What is standing in the way of dam development? Hydropower and
water resource experts in Nepal gradually revealed a complex world of development
theories, the “dubious politics of foreign aid” (Roy, 1999, p. 8), and what often boiled
down to human corruption and greed. Development projects in Nepal are engineered at
the cost of the country’s poorest, for the benefit of the rich.
No easy answer to the question “why doesn’t Nepal have enough electricity?” exists.
Instead of continuing to search for an answer to ‘why doesn’t it yet’, it’s better to focus
on what changes Nepal can make to provide more electricity and regulated water to its
people. One of the central conclusions I made in Nepal is that positive development will
have to stem from within the country itself. Nepal has the ability to develop its water
resources on small and intermediate scales using its own financial, material, and human
resources. This development can occur through community management of rural and
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peri-urban small-scale water resource projects, participatory mechanisms for investment
in state-led larger scale hydropower projects, and pluralism in development decisions.
Nepali people themselves have their country’s best interests at heart; the inherent human
trait of self-interest, with the right checks and balances, can be used positively. The key is
group decision-making, which community management, decentralization, plurality, and
participatory investment, all rely on. In short, Nepal can develop its own water resources
without the muddled input and convoluted ties associated with accepting gigantic loans
from the World Bank or allowing its powerful neighbor, India, to build Big Dams for
export in Nepal.
To support this alternative theory of development, this paper will more closely
examine the flaws of the Western development model and patterns of foreign aid
investment in large development projects, and contrast these with successful nation-led
development efforts, with a specific focus on hydropower and irrigation projects in
Nepal. While hydropower represents only a fraction of the world’s focus on industrial
development, it is tied to two of the world’s most highly sought after and coveted
resources: energy and water. The ubiquity of water and humanity’s common need for it
have led to hydropower representing a possible renewable source of long-term energy for
a global population with ever-increasing energy demands.
The central claim that developing countries have the means for economic
development, without depending on foreign aid, hinges on evidence from community
management techniques of micro-hydro projects. Building many of these small-scale
projects is far less environmentally destructive than one Big Dam, and micro-hydros are
additionally important because electricity and regulated water go directly to serve the
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people affected by a project site. Sovereign development can also rely on local
distribution of electricity from the national grid through decentralization of state-level
industrial monopolies, resulting in better management of existing electricity and water.
Participatory mechanisms further allow for a more people-centered approach to
development (over a traditional construction-centered approach) by providing a
cooperative balance in decision-making. Lastly, policy framework that allows for
domestic investment from all economic classes, opens up financial resources within the
nation that aren’t in state coffers. These approaches are important and necessary because
they avoid large loans tied to specific development projects. The latter often stall
economic growth more than spur it along, and end up causing more human suffering.

Research questions
•

What are the problems with the Western paradigm of development?

•

To what extent is nation-led development that focuses on management and
building smaller scale projects an applicable model for hydropower development
beyond Nepal?

•

How can foreign aid be incorporated better into developing country’s plans and be
people-centered and management-driven, rather than construction-centric?

Research methods
This thesis addresses the powerful forces at work in today’s mainstream
development model, critiques “Big Dams” as a plausible method for healthy water
resource development, and expands on possible alternatives, building upon findings from
an Independent Study Project (ISP) in the spring of 2011 during the Pitzer in Nepal

Berry

9

program. The main basis of this research is through scholarly critiques of modernization
theory and development as well as the written work of several activists who have focused
on the local effects of large-scale hydropower development in India and Nepal.
I have also incorporated primary research from interviews I conducted in Nepal,
about the complex development relationship between India and Nepal and from the
growing support for alternative modes of nation-led hydropower development. My field
research in Nepal focused on the following three questions: Why is there “load-shedding”
(planned nation-wide power cuts)? Why have big hydropower projects consistently failed
to come to fruition in Nepal? And how can the 60% of Nepal’s population still living
without electricity gain access to it? I pursued answers to the first two questions by
interviewing hydropower engineers, policy experts, cultural theorists and hydro-resource
economists in Kathmandu- the political hub of the country. I trailed the heated
conversation about hydropower development in newspapers like Himalayan Times, The
Nepali Times, and the Kathmandu Post.
To answer my third research question- what can be done?- I focused on a
government policy shift that allows for community management of electricity and three
nation-led hydropower development projects: a micro-hydro in the village of Simigaau, a
private sector 10MW project called the Siprin Khola Hydroelectric, and the first
domestically funded mega dam under construction, the Tamakhosi. These three case
studies vary greatly in scale and management, exemplifying how a nation can adapt
methods of hydropower production to the needs of specific locations and groups, without
relying on large international loans. These case studies will be explored in the fourth
chapter on alternatives to the foreign aid dependent Western development model.
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This question of how the majority of Nepal can gain access to electricity has led

to further pursuit of the larger problems in development. Some of the over-arching
problems that have caused large-scale development to stagnate in Nepal are problems on
a wider scale. Therefore, I have continued to research if the possible solutions and
changes to increase electricity production and improve management that I observed and
learned about in Nepal- at different scales, from government policy to community
management- are applicable alternatives to mainstream development patterns across the
Global South.
Overview of Chapters
To understand the present need for alternative development methods, the coming
chapter (II) will first explore the evolution of mainstream development theory since Third
World development became a global focus after the end of World War II. This chapter
will also introduce critiques of the dominant Western development model and the
associated issues with foreign aid. The last part of this chapter focuses on the limits and
challenges of ‘Big Dams’ specifically, in hydropower and water resource development.
The third chapter will discuss India and Nepal’s historic relationship and struggle
for control over shared water resources. It explores the dynamic of the more politically
and financially powerful lower riparian, India, pushing project proposals and loan
packages on Nepal. The component of foreign aid and the large scale of projects
proposed has led to several failed projects, which Chapter III will explore. Contemporary
points of conflict in joint projects between Nepal and India will also be a central focus of
this chapter.
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The final chapter (IV) opens up the possibilities for alternatives to Big Dam

development, reliant on foreign aid, focusing on the case of Nepal. The chapter reviews
recent government policy changes in Nepal that have allowed for ‘communitization’ of
electricity in decentralized rural cooperatives. It also illustrates the three case studies of
Simigaau, Siprin Khola, and Tamakhosi to address the matter of scale and sources of
funding in sovereign development. This chapter aims to demonstrate how these methods
result in more human-centric development with less environmental destruction and social
harm than the Big Dam model. It further exemplifies how independent development,
without foreign aid, results in project returns benefiting the national economy and local
people.
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Chapter II: Critiques of large-scale development in the Global South
Defining Development
In order to understand the global conversation on development and discuss the
Global North’s responsibilities for involvement, the first question must be: how is
‘development’ defined in this context? Global decision-makers in the Global North see
development as synonymous with ‘national progress’ in industry and the growth of a
consumer economy. They define development through the lens of Western market
ideologies, focused on construction and technology and the formation of consumerist
capitalist economies. “Development was—and continues to be for the most part—a topdown, ethnocentric, and technocratic approach” (Escobar, 1995, p. 44). In contrast, an
alternative definition focuses on development that is human-centric rather than
construction-centric. This alternative understanding of development can also refer to
infrastructural and economic growth in technologies or through new methods of
community cooperation that boost the home economy of the country or region being
‘developed’. The difference is not necessarily in the means to achieve development but in
adjusting scale and approach to fit the place and people, and in the basic goal: to improve
the quality of human lives.
Consider the example of a 100 MW reservoir dam built in a developing country
by a foreign company, with funding from the World Bank. First of all, a dam of this size
would displace thousands of people and submerge a valley. In spite of the displaced
villages and environmental damage, the dam may still look like productive development
for the country. However, if most of the energy and regulated water produced is exported
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to other countries for economic revenue, even the benefits of electricity and irrigation are
given away. Building a dam where the only positive quality is an economic return to the
government does not qualify as human-centric development. All of the economic factors
in such a project would not benefit local people and society directly; in fact it would be
socially detrimental when considering the lives that would be disrupted and uprooted for
the dam.
This idea is one of the basic tenets of nation-led development schemes, and is
often referred to as the theory of ‘backward and forward linkages’. Backward linkages in
hydropower development are the benefits a society accrues during the building process of
a project: support to allied industries (electrical, mechanical, and construction related
companies), as well as increased economic activities, and boosted employment. Forward
linkages are the benefits to a society from a finished project using the new electricity and
water: for agriculture, industry, transportation, tourism, health, education, water supply,
and again, increased economic activities and employment (A. Dixit, Interview, May
2011). For any developing country to enjoy both the backward and forward linkages of a
project, it needs to hire domestic contractors, builders, and engineers. Additionally, all
the benefits of a project (for electricity and regulated water either for domestic use or
irrigation) need to be used within the country.
Unfortunately a human-centric definition of ‘development’, which incorporates
the idea of backward and forward linkages, is not the dominant model of development.
Rather, most development projects are based on the first definition, a Western paradigm
of construction. Development is based on economic and technological growth; the
building of cities, industries, and growth of consumer markets mark the successful rise of
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Third World countries to First World capitalist economies. The rest of this chapter
explores the history of the dominant development pattern and some of the critiques aimed
at its construction-centric, foreign aid-dependent focus.
Evolution of the Western development paradigm
Numerous scholars assert that the Western Development model began with the
end of World War II, which marked both the end of direct colonialism and a time when
most of the world was picking up after the ruins of war. A famous point marking the
onset of the “development era” was President Truman’s famous 1949 inaugural speech
where he initiated the “launch of a global effort to assist ‘underdeveloped areas’”
(Sorenson, 2010, p. 5). This spark and three key conditions led to the birth of
modernization theory, which is at the root of the Western development model.
The first key to the evolution of modernization theory was the end of the colonial
era. Most of the ‘underdeveloped’ regions Truman spoke of were previous colonies of
Western nations. The dissolution of these colonial empires led to a flood of new “Third
World” nation states that were “in search of a model of development to promote their
economy and to enhance their political independence” (So, 1990, p. 17). Ironically, the
call to help these nations develop led directly to international trade relationships that only
furthered their economic and social exploitation through neocolonialism and imperialism.
The second condition that gave rise to modernization theory was the rise of the U.S. to
the status of the world’s greatest superpower. In the 1950s, the U.S. “practically took
over the responsibility of managing the affairs of the whole world” (So, 1990, p. 17). The
last reason for the birth of the Western development model was the spread of
communism. During the Cold War period, the Western and Soviet blocs raced not only to
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build superior military power, but also to pull other countries to their ‘side’. To the
Western bloc (predominantly the U.S.), preventing underdeveloped and economically
weak countries from falling prey to communism became integral to national security.
Providing aid to developing countries thus became a means of insurance for Western
democracies- enforcing a ‘you’re either with us or against us’ ideology.
The developed West sought to perfect a development model that would encourage
new nation states to emulate the Western U.S. model of development rather than fall prey
to communism. Walt Rostow, who describes five necessary stages of development for all
human societies, best encapsulates the premises of this theory. All societies begin as
traditional and simplistic. This first stage is marked by limited productivity in agriculture
and little to no industry because of a lack of technology. Societies evolve over
generations of technological development through the stages of ‘preconditions for takeoff’, ‘take-off’, and the ‘drive to maturity, and emerge as modernized societies in the
highly industrialized final stage of ‘high mass consumption’ (Rostow, 1960, p. 4-10).
This last stage of a fully mature society is marked by “real income per head [rising] to a
point where a large number of persons gain a command over consumption which
transcends basic food, shelter, and clothing” and an increase in urban populations
(Rostow, 1960, p. 10). The end goal of modernization is inherently capitalist: for all
societies to reach a level of wealth and industrialization that can sustain a bustling
consumer culture. Increasing living standards in developing countries is only a means to
the end of creating a consumer class.
Three inherent assumptions underlie Rostow’s five evolutionary stages of
modernization: the model assumes that any society’s development will be unidirectional,
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progressive, and gradual (So, 1990, p. 19). From the first through the fifth stage, the
modernization model assumes that all societies move invariably from primitive to
advanced, traditional to modern. Moreover this modernization is ‘good’ and represents
‘progress’ which includes a subjective value judgment. Rostow also believed that
progressing through these stages of development takes generations and often centuries; it
is an “evolutionary not revolutionary” process (So, 1990, p, 19). The defining
characteristics of the modernization model through this evolutionary theory are the basis
of many critiques of mainstream development. The very qualities of homogenization,
Americanization, and dissolution of traditional cultures, that the modernization theorists
tote as the model’s greatest strengths are seen as flaws in the human-centric model of
development. The following section will explore flawed aspects and popular critiques of
the Western development model.

Critiques of mainstream development and foreign aid
One clear problem with the mainstream development model is that it often focuses on
the agendas of First World aid-givers rather than the most pressing needs of Third World
nations. The security motivation for development aid, beginning with the Western fear of
communism, is one driving force of the mainstream development model. This motivation
for development is selfishly Western-centric: the goal of the security-nexus benefits the
Global North, not the underdeveloped countries of the Global South. In a collection of
essays titled Challenging the Aid Paradigm: Western Currents and Asian Alternatives,
Jens Stillhoff Sorenson (2010) claims that the post-World War II development model was
“an instrument for security; it was a security technology designed both to prevent areas
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from falling into the communist camp and as a new way of managing populated
territories that had earlier been under colonial administration. Development [aid] has
always been… used to manage or contain the potential danger posed by the poor” (p. 5).
The perceived security risk posed by poverty in the Third World has evolved since the
Cold War. In the 1970s development aid evolved to preventing shadow economies and
illegal drug trade in much of South America and Africa. In the 21st century, development
aid has been channeled through fighting the “War on Terror”, as underdeveloped nations
are seen as potential breeding grounds for anti-western terrorists (Sorenson, 2010, p. 5).
The fact that none of the above motives for development in the Third World are based in
a desire to eliminate poverty or raise living standards raises serious questions about
development’s presupposed association with ‘help’.
While security motivations for development aid are not directly rooted in a desire to
help underdeveloped countries, modernization theorists do truly believe that their model
is the best way to boost development in the Third World, through encouraging
developing countries to emulate the West. Modernization assumes there is global
agreement that the West is best. Western nations in Europe and the United States “are
viewed as having unmatched economic prosperity and democratic stability. And since
they are the most advanced nations in the world, they have become the models the
latecomers would like to emulate” (So, 1990, p. 34). Thus, mainstream development
theory targets domestic and ‘backwards’ indigenous factors as the main causes of
underdevelopment in the Global South (Sorenson, 2010, p. 7) rather than accepting
responsibility for exploitative colonial and neocolonial relationships that effectively
suppress the domestic economies of Third World countries. Mainstream development
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“seeks to explain the situation of underdeveloped countries as a product of their slowness
or failure to adopt the patterns of efficiency characteristic of developed countries” (dos
Santos, 1996, p. 166).
By blaming underdeveloped countries for their own ‘backwardness’, modernization
theorists see relationships with the West as the key to development and can justify
imposing their ideologies on developing nations in exchange for loans and other aid. First
World ideologies behind development are linked to domination (a relic of colonialism)
and carried out by international lending institutions like the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) (Sorenson 2010, p. 7) The neoliberal market ideologies
behind the IMF and WB have led to these institutions imposing Structural Adjustment
Programs (SAPs) on Third World countries in the name of progress. SAPs impose
conditions for receiving development loans, requiring developing countries to implement
‘free market’ policies: namely, deregulation, privitization, and elimination of trade
barriers. The ‘good governance’ instilled by these programs is synonymous with
democracy (Sorenson, 2010, p. 9). The goal is remaking culturally distinct nations into
homogenized images of Western consumer societies. By placing the nexus of blame for
‘underdevelopment’ on the developing countries themselves, it’s easy to see why
Western development theory insists that building international trade relationships with
the West will pull these economies into the modernized world.
The idea that trade with the West will help the Third World develop is the source of
one of the major critique of mainstream development, resulting in the emergence of an
alternative theory in the early 1970s, advocating for market separation from the West.
Proponents of ‘dependency theory’ claim that the capitalist system of global trade is on

Berry

19

inherently unequal terms and maintains the hierarchy of colonial relationships through
imperialist expansion. The Brazilian economist, dos Santos, noted that market
relationships between developing countries and the West leads to development that is
“unequal and combined—unequal because development of parts of the system occurs at
the expense of other parts… and combined… because it is the combination of these
inequalities and the transfer of resources from the most backward and dependent sectors
to the most advanced and dominant ones which explains the inequality, deepens it, and
transforms it into a necessary and structural element of the world economy” (dos Santos,
1996, 166). Resources are extracted from developing countries on the periphery to invest
in the industrial development of the dominant Western countries at the core, undermining
the resource base for domestic development in Third World countries. Thus, dependency
theorists argue that ‘de-linking’ with Western countries by relying on local production
and trade with other developing countries is the key to development (Sorenson, 2010, p.
8).
While dependency theorists advocated for market separation from the West and local
production in the ‘70s, a new economic model of neoliberalism rapidly came to dominate
the global market in the ‘80s, toting ‘free market’ ideology as the key to healthy
development. The original transition from Keynesian economics to a globally dominant
neoliberal system is another purported strength of the mainstream development model
that doesn’t produce the development results it claims to. The post World War II model
of development existed within a Keynesian economic system where national
governments were considered a necessary regulating force to balance market inequalities
and promote the state’s welfare. The Keynesian solution to capitalism’s contradictions
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“was to acknowledge the inevitable role of social structures, in this case through
government intervention, to obviate market distortions” with the goal of closing the
development gap (Vandermeer, 2011, p. 22). This period allowed Japan, followed by
South Korea, China, and many South Asian countries, to ascend toward First World
industrialized status through “export-led growth”. With Keynesian market controls,
individual governments were able to use tariffs to protect their growing industries (e.g.
Japan’s Toyota exports to the U.S.) and compete in First World markets.
Unfortunately for the new success of these developing countries, Keynesian
thought began giving way to neoliberalist ideology in the 1980s, marking a new stage in
the evolution of development and foreign aid. Neoliberalism is generally characterized by
drastic reduction of the state’s involvement in the economy “to an absolute minimum and
unleash[ing] the forces of the market and promote privitization, outsourcing and
deregulation” (Sorenson, 2010, p. 9). Starting with Reagan’s administration, neoliberal
economics, advocating for extremely limited state control of markets, began to dominate
in international trade- effectively nullifying developing countries’ best method to protect
and encourage growth in their industries using government tariffs. The neoliberal system
has been “very successful in transferring wealth from poorer sectors (social classes and
countries) to richer sectors, but devastating to the aspirations of countries on the lower
slopes of the development mountain” (Vandermeer, 2011, p. 23). Backlash against the
destructive forces of neoliberalism has led to an alternative model of “South-South
cooperation” that dependency theorists first suggested. The clear failure of the neoliberal
model to assist in Third World development led to the formation of the BRIC block—a
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cooperation between Brazil, Russia, India, and China—to return to Keynesian principles
of trade between countries in the Global South (Vandermeer, 2011, p. 23).
While Keynesian economics seemed to be a step toward closing the wealth gap
between the First and Third Worlds, neoliberal free-market ideology has allowed private
industries to widen the wealth gap more than ever before. Neoliberalism’s influence on
development lies in enforcing a free enterprise system where the corporations who can
make the most profit, win. What is the motivation for continuing with programs as
seemingly generous as the World Bank in a neoliberal ‘dog eat dog’ world? Giving aid to
developing countries will supposedly help develop their consumer markets- thereby
increasing the profits of the world’s large corporations (largely controlled by the
developed countries of the West). With this model, it seems fair to judge development
success based on a population’s shopping power and consumer drive. Economic security,
rather than political security, drives development aid today.
In the wake of havoc wrought by neoliberal policies on developing countries, a
new alternative called post-development theory evolved in the 1980s, critiquing the
global hierarchy of Western hegemony in mainstream development that earlier
dependency theorists also focused on. Post-development theorists, like Arturo Escobar,
argue that the entire concept of the ‘Third World’ is a notion created and perpetuated by
the First World. The Western development model maintains power relationships through
the notion of the Third World by classifying the world’s nations into a subjective
hierarchy based on concentration of wealth and economic power. “Development relies on
setting up the world as a picture, so that the whole can be grasped in some orderly fashion
as forming a structure” (Escobar, 1995, p. 56). Only within the Western framework that
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prioritizes modernization and industrialization does the “Third World” have to be
considered worse off. Post-development theory holds that the practice of ‘development’
maintains Western hegemony over the Global South in ways that are destructive rather
than constructive to the Global South’s development. By ‘unmaking’ development ideals
we can release Third World countries from the persistent exploitative control of the West.
One way, Escobar argues, that the First World maintains control is through the
image of the Third World portrayed by popular media. He points to ubiquitous images
seen in magazines, of malnourished Africans or over-worked South American children,
as examples of the ‘violence of representation’ (a phrase coined by Teresa de Lauretis,
1987). Mostly these images are meant to evoke pity in viewers, so they will donate
money to a certain organization to feed or educate Third World children and give them
opportunities for ‘a better life’. The important aspect to grasp is that this narrative of need
results only in an exchange of money- not a sharing of culture or any true understanding
between donors in the Global North and would-be Third World recipients of aid. Escobar
claims that these emotive images are “the most striking symbol of the power of the First
World over the Third. A whole economy of discourse and unequal power relations is
encoded in that body…This violence, moreover, is extreme; scientific representations of
hunger and ‘overpopulation’ (they often go together) are most dehumanizing and
objectifying” (Escobar, 1995, p. 103). By evoking pity responses and objectifying human
lives, the Western-centric media ensures a steady flow of financial aid through NGOs and
reinforces the relative ‘otherness’ of the Global South- maintaining a distinction between
First and Third World.
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Post-development theory holds that this understanding of development, where

Western aid is the solution to Third World poverty, only reinforces the three main
assumptions of modernization: 1) that tradition must be snuffed out in order to achieve
modernity, 2) that all countries exposed to Western societies will want to emulate them,
3) and that any society can modernize following the same steps (and through the same
five stages) as the developed West. Post-development theory completely discounts the
idea that developing countries are backward and primitive; that they are trapped in the
first stage of development and need to shed tradition in order to ‘progress’ and become
more like the Global North. It also critiques the ethnocentric assumption that the rest of
the world necessarily desires or should desire to be more like the West.
Most importantly, this critique of mainstream development challenges the very
basis of the Western development model: that what worked for the West must work for
everyone. While the general conception of modernization theory behind the mainstream
development model holds that all Third World societies can follow the same stages of
development that Western countries went through, post-development theorists argue that
the development pathway followed by the Global North is not a viable cut and paste
model for the Third World. “Even a modest acquaintance with history shows that
underdevelopment is not original or traditional and that neither the past nor the present of
the underdeveloped countries resemble in any important respect the past of nowdeveloped countries. The now-developed countries were never underdeveloped, though
they may have been undeveloped” (Frank, 1970, p. 5). The modernization model doesn’t
take into account how these undeniable discrepancies in the economic and social histories
of Third World countries gave rise to the condition of ‘underdevelopment’. After all,
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“most of our theoretical categories and guides to development policy have been distilled
exclusively from the historical experience of the European and North American advanced
capitalist nations” which leads to the false assumption that underdeveloped nations’
“past[s] and indeed their present[s] resembles earlier stages of the history of the nowdeveloped countries” (Frank, 1970, p. 4). The fatal misconception here relates back to the
dependency theory critique that Western development relied heavily on exploiting the
resources of other countries through colonialism and imperialism, and now through
neoliberal ‘free market’ policies. This past and current economic exploitation has resulted
in the underdeveloped state of the Third World. This critique ties back to the central
argument that development which truly benefits Third World countries “can now occur
only independently of most of these relations” with the now-developed Global North
(Frank, 1970, p. 5) through nation-led development.
While dependency and post-development theorists promote the exclusion of the
Global North in the development of the Global South, other alternative development
theories that showed promise have unfortunately been assimilated into the mainstream
neoliberal model based on Western involvement. In the 1970s, waves of activism gave
rise to ‘participatory’ and ‘sustainable’ development theories to combat the perceived
neglect of local voices in the development process. While these are, by themselves,
critiques of mainstream technology-driven development, they work mostly within the
model of neoliberal development practices. Funneling foreign aid through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) has realized a shift in development aid policy “to
operate directly on populations; this is reflected in radical interventions in the South and
in the promotion of NGOs that can operate in societies directly rather than through states
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(Sorenson, 2010, pp. 12-13). ‘Participatory’ and ‘sustainable’ are catchwords of many
NGOs whose goal is to include local people in the decision making process and “sustain
local lifestyles through non-material development” (Sorenson, 2010, p. 10). There is
nothing wrong with this; in fact, it seems like a positive step toward the alternative
human-centric definition of development offered at the beginning of this chapter.
Unfortunately, foreign NGOs are often more focused on the desires of their financial
donors than the actual needs of the aid beneficiaries (D. Gyawali, Interview, May 2011;
A. Dixit, Interview, May 2011). Even well-intentioned development aid can go awry
when the decisions are being made by people in the First World, without first hand
knowledge of a culture or the most pressing needs of a people. Most NGOs have a
specific area they claim to provide funding to, whether it is putting an end to child
trafficking or building health care outposts in rural villages. The point is that many
NGOs, and the donors who provide their funding decide where the money goes, instead
of the aid recipients getting to decide where funding is needed most. Local people are not
given sovereignty over their own development decisions even under these so called
‘sustainable’ and ‘participatory’ development models.
In addition to the largely unintentional harm wrought by not giving people in
developing countries the right to make their own development decisions, NGOs are also
subject to the same distorted perception of what counts as ‘successful development’ that
afflicts the World Bank and IMF. They tend to share the belief that wherever money is
given, positive development will ensue. As many critics of the top-down aid approach
acknowledge, “Since the 1950’s, aid organizations have exhibited an enduring tendency
to define outputs in terms of money disbursed rather than services delivered” (Easterly,
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2002, p. 288). Moreover they’ve demonstrated a vulnerability to “institutional amnesia”:
where the same modernizing approaches to development are repeated over and over
despite their often observed lack of success. Because of this “institutional ‘Groundhog
Day’… every decade or two similar pronouncements are repackaged by a new generation
of policy-makers and presented afresh as the way forward” (Duffield, 2010, p. 26).
The problem with repeating the same tried and untrue development patterns over
the years boils down to the unacceptable expectations of sacrifice: from the cost to
people’s livelihoods, to marginalized indigenous cultures, not to mention the
overwhelming financial cost of most foreign aid funded development schemes. The worst
thing about the price of development is the ignorance that international lending
institutions and leaders have sustained through the decades, sweeping hidden costs to
people and the environment under the rug in favor of touting the projects built. The
United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs published a report on
“Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries” over sixty
years ago. The report acknowledges the hidden costs of development that the mainstream
development model ignores: “There is a sense in which rapid economic progress is
impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old
social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed and race have to burst; and
large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their
expectations of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to pay the
full price of economic progress.” (UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs, 1951,
n.p.) This report demonstrated a clear understanding of major flaws in the mainstream

Berry

27

development approach, vouching for how few communities can actually withstand the
full cost of development. Over half a century later, those words still haven’t sunk in.
As long as Third World countries have their development pathways decided for
them by wealthy outsiders, a message is perpetuated that the people of these countries are
inferior and incapable of making their own development decisions. Earlier discussion of
post-development theory explained how this message is perpetuated in Western
countries, but it is equally important how people in developing countries are made to feel
that their cultures and lifestyles are sub-par. The functionalist modernization model
assumes that all development must be transformative: “in order for a society to move into
modernity, its traditional structures and values must be totally replaced by a set of
modern values” (So, 1990, p. 34). Western development not only strips countries and
people of their sovereignty, but also legitimizes governments allowing any project that
will increase economic production, regardless of scale and dismissive of human costs.
Through mainstream development, Escobar argues,
It became acceptable for… rulers to subject their populations to an infinite
variety of interventions, to more encompassing forms of power and systems of
control; so important that First and Third World elites accepted the price of
massive impoverishment, of selling Third World resources to the most convenient
bidder, of degrading their physical and human ecologies, of killing and torturing,
of condemning their indigenous populations to near extinction; so important that
many in the Third World began to think of themselves as inferior,
underdeveloped, and ignorant and to doubt the value of their own culture,
deciding instead to pledge allegiance to the banners of reason and progress.
(Esobar, 1995, p. 52).
In one sentence, Escobar elucidates many of the main problems associated with
Western, construction-centric development. The traditional focus on “Big” development
projects in the Western model leads directly to suppressing and ignoring the needs of
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local people most affected by development projects. Governments subjecting their own
people to impoverishment for the sake of the ‘common good’ and national progress is
also a central theme in the writing of other development critics. In opposition to the giant
Sardar Sarovar dam on India’s Narmada River, Indian activist, Arundhati Roy, asks about
who definitely controls decisions about natural resources- the people who live with them
or the government? Who has the right to develop them or not? The fact that this dam, the
Sardar Sarovar, came to represent a larger political battle for control led the Indian
government to take especially brutal action in the 1990s to demonstrate its might and
squash protests. “For the people of the valley, the fact that the stakes were raised to this
degree has meant that their most effective weapon—specific facts about specific issues in
this specific valley—has been blunted by the debate on the big issues “ (Roy, 1999, pp. 910). Modernization discussions driving mainstream development decisions occur at a
“highly general and abstract level. Since their aim is to explain general patterns, universal
trends, and common prospects for Third World Development, they do not want to be
preoccupied with unique cases and historically specific events” (So, 1990, p. 35). This
development model treats human beings as numbers, weighing statistics instead of lives.
Most importantly, Escobar emphasizes, when development offers a path to increased
production (of energy, food, industry, etc…) developing countries see only opportunity,
“cloud[ing] the awareness of the impossibility of fulfilling the promises that development
seemed to be making” (Escobar, 1995, p. 52).
The worry that Western development makes impossible promises is taken a step
farther by the critique that modern development and associated foreign aid are actually
worsening the problems they claim to address. Through the capitalist political economy,
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Escobar argues, “modern people [have come] to see life in general through the lens of
production” (Escobar, 1995, p. 60). One example of how mainstream development
actions exacerbated an already existing problem by focusing too narrowly on production
is in the Green Revolution’s response to the global food crisis. The Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) statistics from 2010 show that 925 million
people in the world are ‘food insecure’ and don’t have enough to eat. 98 percent of this
population lives in developing countries (FAO news release, 2010). This number was
proportionally even higher in the 1950s when development decisions began to
increasingly target the need for food, inciting a Green Revolution. The movement was
hailed for helping to provide for a growing global population by boosting agricultural
yields—supposedly preventing the starvation of millions—but it also undermined locally
adapted techniques for farming and marginalized the poorest farmers. Susan George
coined the phrase ‘more food, more hunger’ in How the Other Half Dies (1976),
revealing the paradox wherein development strategies intended to alleviate hunger have
simply aggravated the problem.
The focus on increased crop production led to replacing traditional crops and
irrigation with Western crops and technology. Indian activist and physicist, Vandana
Shiva, discusses the consequences of replacing traditional with modern, noting that the
Green Revolution-funded “miracle seeds” actually displaced local drought-resistant crops
in favor of genetically modified, water-guzzling crops (Shiva, 2002, p. 9). Not only were
these homogenized crops more vulnerable to being wiped out by a single disease or pest,
they only deepened water issues when traditional human and animal-powered irrigation
techniques were thrown out in favor of more ‘efficient’ Western technology: “oil engines
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and electric pumps that extracted water faster than nature’s cycles could replenish the
groundwater” (Shiva, 2002, p.10). Mainstream development typically assumes that
traditional technologies, despite specific adaptions to locale and culture, are worthless
compared to Western technology. As economist Mark Duffield notes, modern
“development is able to insist on being judged by a yet distant future, rather than a past
that has been lived and experienced” (Duffield, 2010, p. 27). The tried and true methods
that farmers had developed over centuries to maintain their water supply couldn’t stand
up to the mighty knowledge the West sought to impart.
In spite of the development paradigm’s blindness to the value of culture and
locally adapted technology, there is still a contingent of development theorists who
believe that international lending institutions like the World Bank and IMF have a
valuable role to play in helping the Global South develop. These theorists critique the
‘Americanizing’ blanket approach to project planning rather than the core of the
development paradigm itself. They suggest that although the World Bank uses flawed
practices and historically neglects its responsibility to follow through on projects in
addressing human needs, these problems aren’t inherent in the World Bank itself and
could be fixed. The theory claims, as many development critics do, that many World
Bank projects have had the exact opposite effect of their intent to alleviate poverty, but it
disagrees with the dependency and post-development belief that the WB maintains
colonial power dynamics between the Global North and South. Instead these projects’
overall failure is attributed to the World Bank’s lack of follow through and attempts to
replicate Europe and America’s development techniques “in cookie cutter fashion around
the world despite compelling differences in resources, culture, economic structures and
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educational levels” (Moore, 1998, n.p.) While Moore refers to these giant flops as “big
projects with small results” many of these big projects might actually inflict more harm
than good.
The point here is not that a global food crisis does not exist, or that the West
doesn’t have a responsibility to help; the issue is that the modern development model
goes about change the wrong way. Escobar, extrapolating on Susan George’s famous
quote, ‘more food, more hunger,’ pointed out that “countries that were self-sufficient in
food crops at the end of World War II— many of them even exported food to
industrialized nations— became net food importers throughout the development era”
(Escobar, 1995, p. 104). Something is amiss with world food programs that leave
developing countries increasingly dependent on foreign aid. The goal ought to be
decreasing foreign dependence and strengthening traditional agricultural systems, not
tearing them down. How have these development systems been grinding in reverse
without anyone calling a halt to the process? The answer lies again in the development
model’s focus on statistical outputs rather than actual effects on people, a problem that
results from the large scale of development projects.
Smaller projects are a much safer scale for development. Small development
projects cost less and affect fewer people so they allow room to learn from mistakes and
to experiment with different development technologies, instead of hinging all of a
country’s development hopes on a few large-scale projects. A prominent economist and
development critic, Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, “worried that foreign aid was making
people ‘poorer by giving them Western tastes’” (Pupavac, 2010 p. 57). Schumacher
firmly rejected the material values of modern Western consumer society that the
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mainstream development model seeks to spread to the Third World. Instead,
Schumacher’s model advocated for decentralized, locally adapted, community-centric
development in Third World countries. This alternative is based on ‘teach a man to fish’
ideology: “The gift of material goods makes people dependent, but the gift of knowledge
makes them free” (Schumacher, 1974, p. 163). The warning that Western development
conflates ‘growth’ with true development and places too high an estimation on
technological solutions is a sound critique. Moreover, the alternative options offered in
Small is Beautiful (1973) have shown great promise and success in developing countries.
But, it is easy to see where Schumacher’s critics poke holes in his arguments with claims
about misplaced romantic ideals of pre-industrial societies and idyllic rural lifestyles.
“The cultural critic Raymond Williams notes how the very distance of affluent urban
dwellers from the realities of rural hardship facilitates their urban romanticizing, which
may hinder the development of policies to improve rural lives” (Williams, 1973, cited in
Pupavac, 2010, p. 61). Schumacher deserved some admonishment at least, despite his
best intentions, for failing to see the hypocrisy in how his philosophy prescribed a
lifestyle of backbreaking labor with no material aspirations on Third World countries that
he never had to live with himself.
These popular views on the Western development model and critiques of foreign
aid lay out a framework to understand why so many grand-scale development projects
have stuttered and failed in Third World countries. Even the projects that are finished are
often fatally flawed in design or longevity and far more costly than initial estimates from
international lending institutions. To look at some of the specific obstacles and pitfalls of
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Western development projects, the second half of this chapter will focus on specific
issues associated with Big Dams for irrigation and hydropower.

Critiques of hydropower: Challenges and limits of Big Dams
There’s a good reason why dams are such a large consideration in development
decisions for the Global South. Water is arguably our most vital natural resource and the
biggest limiting factor in where humans can survive. Harnessed correctly, our freshwater
rivers can provide power, grow our food and sustain entire cities with drinking water.
Best of all, humans can’t use up all the water on Earth- at least not permanently. There
will always be an equal amount of water cycling through our atmosphere, oceans and
land no matter how we use or degrade it. In this sense, it is a more sustainable resource
for energy than our finite supply of fossil fuels. It is logical, within Western development
ideology, to want to regulate water for human use. Dams are a clear way to take a
resource that is often damaging to human societies because of cycles of floods and
droughts and harness it for power and agriculture. Dams can additionally protect human
settlements and provide a valuable resource for human sustenance. Even Big Dams, that
are up to hundreds of meters high, have proven their value time and time again in the
development of many of the U.S.’ major cities. The tallest dam in the United States, the
Oroville Dam in California at 234 meters high (California Department of Water
Resources (CADWR), 2000), provides vital water to the city of Los Angeles and supports
agricultural production in the Central Valley. Oroville’s size allows it to hold back more
than 3.5 million acre-feet of water in its reservoir (CADWR, 2000), to provide regulated
water for irrigation, municipal use, electricity, and flood control to over 40 million people
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in California. The great reservoirs on the Colorado River, including the 110-mile long
Mead Lake created by the Hoover Dam, and Lake Powell of the Glen Canyon Dam,
provide necessary water to the desert states of the Southwest. Dams have clearly
accomplished development that has been integral in the West, but at what cost?
Despite their benefits for regulating water, dam building is incredibly
controversial in the global conversation on Third World development. It’s not that dams
are inherently bad. They have a vital purpose for controlling and regulating freshwater for
our increasing global population. Only 3 percent of Earth’s water is fresh water (the other
97 percent is in oceans) so as infinite as our water resources initially seem, they do need
to be preserved. In fact, only .3 percent of that 3 percent freshwater is surface water that
is available for human use (most freshwater is frozen in glaciers). To see the effect of
dams, the available water is narrowed even further because only 2 percent of that .3
percent surface water is flowing in rivers (United States Geological Survey (USGS),
2012). Our sustainable resource, shed in this light, begins to look rather finite.
Even with such a finite amount of freshwater available for human use, the main
problem with water is not how much we have globally, but its uneven distribution across
the Earth. As our global population grows, we continue to extract water from aquifers
through groundwater mining, faster than precipitation can recharge these sources. This
problem is especially dire in deserts and densely populated regions where water shortages
lead to famines. Humanity turned to building dams in order to capture more water from
rivers and seasonal rains, rather than extracting more water from diminishing aquifers.
There are now more than 45,000 dams taller than 15 meters high in the world. Combined,
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they can hold back 6500 km3 of water, which is about 15 percent of the total annual river
runoff globally (Nillson et al, 2005).
Recognizing the importance of dams, it is important to clarify that the purpose of
this thesis is not to argue against all dam technology but to shed light on the problems
with the way the Western model approaches dam development. Most of the social and
environmental consequences of dam building are related to the matter of scale: the bigger
the dam, the more environmental and social repercussions it inflames. Big Dams’ risks
and negative consequences far outweigh economic gains from electricity produced or
irrigation benefits. The goal here is, as Arundhati Roy (1999) said, “dismantling the Big:
big dams, big ideologies, big contradictions, big countries, big wars” (p.12). To focus
only on the technology of dams and their potential benefits ignores the underlying
problem of what the true costs are. Arundhati Roy’s experience interviewing people in
cities that benefited from hydropower illustrates how little general populations (who are
not directly affected by the dam site) understand a Big Dam’s repercussions. Urban
people in India admitted that the submergence of valley villages for reservoirs was sad,
but necessary because of the ‘greater’ need for electricity. Where did the value judgment
stem from? Is electricity worth more than homes, forests, and farmland? This type of
ignorant demand entitlement has led to socially engineered famines in most of the
developing world in the past century. Most people have some opinion on Big Dams but
very few know anything significant about them. To elucidate the true repercussions of
building Big Dams, the following section will generally explore the conflicting purposes
of dams, consequences of irrigation, and environmental impacts of Big Dams.
Additionally, it will analyze social and economic problems caused by the World Bank

Berry

36

and national governments, including displacement of rural people, politicization of water
rights, the high financial and social cost of foreign funded dam projects, and how these
projects fall short of expectations.

•

Conflicting purposes
Dams serve a multitude of purposes: for hydropower, flood control, and to

provide regulated water for irrigation purposes. Unfortunately these three major purposes
don’t coincide well. While this is a paradox applicable to all dams, when considering Big
Dams, their greater size and overall inefficiency because of these conflicting purposes
leads to greater environmental and social consequences. To produce hydropower, water
must always be flowing; that means a dam for hydroelectric power has to release water
constantly to turn its turbines. Dams meant to protect against floods create reservoirs that
are maximally effective if kept at low level or empty so that they can contain sudden
influxes of rain or snow melt. On the other hand, dams for regulated clean water and
irrigation purposes are most effective if their reservoirs are always kept as full as
possible, to provide enough water during dry seasons and droughts. Multipurpose
projects can never serve all three purposes at maximum efficiency: “a water project
designed to provide multiple benefits cannot provide optimal benefits on all counts”
(Dixit, 2002, p. 370). But dams built for a single purpose are a waste- so dam managers
tend to mix purposes to increase profit. For flood control, a reservoir should ideally be
empty but “the operators of multi-purpose reservoir tend to keep the flood moderation
space full to generate electricity because it fetches direct revenue, whereas flood
avoidance benefits are indirect” (Dixit, 2002, p. 374).
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The common problem with all three dam uses is that they are either more efficient

with or inherently require large reservoirs to be built for water storage. While ‘run of the
river’ projects (which are only applicable for hydropower production) are cheaper and
less environmentally destructive- they rely entirely on the flow of water and therefore
lose their efficacy during dry seasons. In order to provide reliable electricity and certainly
to provide any flood control and regulated water benefits, reservoirs are necessary. The
main reason development decision-makers haven’t simply jumped on the reservoir
building bandwagon is because of the higher social and environmental cost of building
storage projects: “if a project includes a reservoir, which is a body of water collected in a
valley not designed by nature to hold one- [it] inundates the flora and fauna of the valley”
(Dixit, 2002, p. 370) including any human settlements that get in its way. Reservoirs are
permanent floods that displace people and destroy valuable forest and river ecologies.

•

Perennial irrigation
For many developing countries in the Global South, monsoons are their main

source of precipitation for agriculture. In these countries, like India and Nepal for
example, most rivers are monsoon fed. More than 80 percent of the river’s flow occurs
between June and September so irrigation during the long dry season is a critical issue.
Regulated water from dams is proven to turn unproductive agricultural land that could
only support one crop per year into land that produces three or more crops per year!
Think of the huge financial gain to poor farmers in drought-wrought developing
countries; think of the huge amount of food that irrigated land can provide to starving
populations! It’s a beautiful idea, but an unattainable dream. Adding huge amounts of
water into an ecological system that isn’t adapted for steady water flow year round (e.g.
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areas with short bouts of monsoon rain and long dry seasons) has other consequences
beyond the desired increase in soil productivity. The most important negative
consequences of increased irrigation from dams are waterlogging and salinization of soils
that stem from the rising water table underground. Rising groundwater levels dissolve
salts that were previously well dispersed throughout the soil horizons and fill up pore
spaces in the soil, replacing vital oxygen with a flood of water. Saline water is drawn to
the surface through capillary action in plant roots and the soil becomes waterlogged. The
increased salt concentrations eventually become toxic to plants; the ‘salinization’ effect
that plagues irrigated farmland in desert environments. The accompanying ‘waterlogging’
of soils can effectively drown crops because the soil isn’t well oxygenated.
To explain the effects of long-term perennial irrigation, Arundhati Roy makes an
analogy to long term steroid use’s weakening effect on human athletes: “gradually, in the
way a steroid-using athlete becomes an invalid, the soil becomes depleted and degraded,
and agricultural yields begin to decrease” (Roy, 1999, p. 69). These problems only arise
when the new influx of irrigated water from a dam is not coupled with adequate drainage
systems. Drainage systems are too often left out of the equation because they are more
costly than the irrigation systems themselves- something I will discuss more fully in a
section about the high hidden costs of dam building.
Others point out Big Dams’ failure to even deliver the perceived benefits of
perennial irrigation. In the Bank’s first 50 years it lent $44 billion to water resource
projects for irrigation and drainage, regulating water supply, sewage and hydropower
(World Bank Annual Report, 1994; McCully & Sklar, 1994, n.p.) and in almost half of
the irrigation projects, agricultural productivity actually declined! Roy adds that Big
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Dams aren’t following through on increasing crop productivity in the long run through
examples in India: “Over the last fifty years India has spent Rs 87,000 crores (a crore is
10 million rupees) on the irrigation sector alone. Yet there are more drought-prone areas
and more flood-prone areas than there were in 1947” (Government of India (GOI) figures
cited in Roy, 1999, p. 15).
Beyond the long-term risks of salinization, waterlogging, and slow degradation of
soils from over use, there is an unexpected, and more immediate, environmental justice
aspect to increasing irrigation potentials with dams. The additional water makes it
possible to grow more water-intensive cash crops like sugarcane, cotton, rice, and
soybeans in place of traditional drought-resistant crops like millet, barley and corn. The
shift in available water leads to a parallel transition from farmers growing what they can
afford to eat, to growing expensive crops that they can only afford to sell, in order to
make their investment back. “By linking themselves to the market” Roy argues, the
farmers “lose control over their lives” (Roy, 1999, p. 68). Small farmers’ increasing
dependence on the costly regulated water from the dam and shift to growing expensive
crops for market can lead to a paradox: India is a leading world agricultural exporter, yet
people are starving in this country that produces excess food: “Indians are too poor to buy
the food their country produces” (Roy, 1999, p. 22).

•

Environmental impacts
Reservoirs permanently flood great swathes of land behind Big Dams. They often

displace human communities, but sadly, humans are still the lucky ones in these
scenarios. Most species are not as mobile as humans. Valuable agricultural land, old
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growth forests, ancient ruins and religious sites, and all the animals that live within these
valleys are flooded away. The river ecosystems themselves are also damaged. Dams are
devastating to spawning fish- especially anadromous fish that migrate between the ocean
and freshwater spawning habitats. If a dam blocks their path to evolutionarily
programmed places to spawn, entire populations can die out. Anadromous fish, like
salmon in much of Western North America or the hilsa in India, are often keystone
species that dozens of other species rely on. Not to mention the fisher communities who
also depend on these fish for their livelihoods. “Dams have either eliminated or
endangered one fifth of the world’s freshwater fish” (McCully 1998, p. 46). Already, on
dammed rivers across the developed and developing world scientists have observed rapid
decreases in fish biodiversity. We can’t predict or control all the cascading consequences
of this type of river ecosystem devastation.
One argument claims that with more careful planning, dams don’t have to be as
environmentally detrimental as they are today. If Big Dam planning included
consideration of fish spawning grounds and built dams upriver, some dam specialists
argue it wouldn’t negatively affect the currents that carries smolts to sea, nor would any
fish have to die trying to get over dams or swept through turbines. One author who
studies dams built on the Columbia River in the Pacific Northwest, goes so far as to argue
that dams can cool water downstream and block silt that can be detrimental to fish
populations (White, 1995, n.p.). The assertion that dams cool water downstream is
inaccurate; logically dams decrease the regular flow of any river and slow flow and less
water will increase water temperatures to dangerous levels for fish (Miller, 2009, pp. 167170). In one past water conflict on the Klamath River basin spanning the border of
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California and Oregon, where dams and irrigation won out over fishing rights, two
consecutive years of drought left 80,000 adult spawning salmon dead; a devastating
number without even counting juveniles or future populations that would come from their
eggs. Biologists found that these salmon died from a gill rot disease that flourishes in low
flows and warm temperatures caused by the dam upstream (Miller, 2009, p. 173). Despite
the inaccuracy of the claim that dams can cool water downstream, the point that fish
spawning habits could be taken into consideration when planning dam sites is a valid one.
While fish populations suffer beneath dams, the lakes created by reservoirs
dramatically change the chemistry of the water behind the dam. The deep, still water
prevents oxygenation, creating an intolerant environment for most river life. The warm
surfaces of these reservoirs spread disease through bursts of toxic algal blooms (Roy
1999, p. 14) and are also the perfect breeding grounds for mosquitoes, resulting in
increases of malaria outbreaks near reservoirs in sub-tropical regions (Roy 1999, p. 49).
Beyond the river ecosystem, the surrounding forests slated for submergence are often
clear cut and hauled away for timber prior to the reservoir filling with water. In India,
between two Big Dams on the Narmada River, “the Narmada Sagar dam and the Sardar
Sarovar dam, 50,000 hectares of old growth, broad-leaved forest will be submerged.”
(Roy 1999, p. 64) Somehow, the engineers carefully troubleshooting possible misfortunes
that could befall these Big Dams missed a basic biology lesson connecting forests, rivers,
and rain. Mass deforestation is partly responsible for decreased water flow in the rivers
because barren landscapes attract less precipitation. Deforestation also increases siltation
(a major problem for dams) due to soil erosion. The World Bank is a large institution,
predisposed to a majorly top-down approach, so it doesn’t take into account individual
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places or disparate landscapes. For example, the already high silt content of Himalayan
rivers makes dam structures that worked well in the U.S. far more inefficient and subject
to major disrepair.
Perhaps the most far-reaching environmental damage Big Dams can incur is
mounting evidence linking Big Dams to earthquakes. Scientists have known that the
weight of water held back by large reservoirs affects seismic activity for over half a
century, since scientists started detecting the effects of the U.S.’ Hoover Dam (Naik &
Oster, 2009, n.p.). The concern became more of a focal point after a 2008 earthquake in
the Sichuan province of China killed 80,000 people. While evidence tying the nearby
Zipingpu high dam to the 7.9 magnitude earthquake is still unclear, the added weight of
320 million tons of water in a reservoir only 500 meters from the earthquake’s fault line
could clearly have a drastic affect on the geology of the area (Naik & Oster, 2009, n.p.).
At the very least, careful consideration should be given to not placing Big Dams along
fault lines. Even better, smaller dams that don’t hold millions of tons of water in areas not
naturally designed to hold massive lakes could become the dominant model for dam
development.
Considering the variety and breadth of environmental devastation that improper
planning of Big Dams can result in, it’s unforgiveable that “the [World] Bank continually
focuses on the mitigation of environmental impacts rather than on avoiding adverse
impacts in the first place. The latter could often be achieved by altering a project’s design
or siting it in a different location” (Moore, 1998, n.p.). I have doubts about the supposed
ease of simply shifting a site; there are people and valuable ecosystems everywhere so
there will always be adverse impacts that should be fully considered. Still, the central
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point- that full environmental consideration isn’t an important enough piece in the current
planning of Big Dams- is on point.
Lest we begin to imagine that the World Bank simply has no way to know about the
extent of Big Dam’s environmental degradation or hasn’t received this widespread
information yet- it’s time to introduce the Morse Report. Two decades ago, in 1992, the
World Bank itself called for an Independent Review team to do a full analysis of the
environmental effects of an in-progress mega dam in India, the Sardar Sarovar. Negative
media attention brought on by soon-to-be displaced Adhivasi activists was the motivation
for the review team rather than any genuine interest on the part of the World Bank. The
team’s review, called “the Morse Report”, examined every aspect of the project:
“hydrology, and water management, the upstream environment, sedimentation,
catchment-area treatment, the downstream environment, the anticipation of likely
problems in the command area—water logging, salinity, drainage, health, and the impact
on wildlife. It is the most balanced, unbiased, yet damning indictment of the relationship
between the Indian State and the World Bank (Roy 1999, p. 44). The Morse Report,
without a hint of doubt, reported back to the World Bank that the Sardar Sarovar project
hadn’t properly taken into account the true environmental and social costs of
displacement from the dam. The Bank couldn’t possibly have taken these costs into
account, because they hadn’t bothered to figure out what they were. In the Morse
Report’s introduction, the authors summarized their findings that “the Sardar Sarovar
Projects as they stand are flawed, that resettlement and rehabilitation of all those
displaced by the Projects is not possible under prevailing circumstances, and that
environmental impacts of the Projects have not been properly considered or adequately
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addressed. Moreover we believe that the Bank shares responsibility with the borrower for
the situation that has developed… we think that the wisest course would be for the Bank
to step back from the Projects and consider them afresh” (Morse & Berger, 1992, p.
XXV). Eventually, after the World Bank attempted to apply superficial fixes to the
problems the Morse Report addressed, they did pull their financial backing of the project.
At that point, India was already too financially invested and the project was already under
construction- so it continued despite the Morse Report’s warnings.

•

Displacement
Whenever there is a storage component to a hydro-resource project, the reservoir

is likely to displace any people who live in river valleys behind the dam. One of the main
factors that the World Bank tends to ignore in its cost estimates for dam projects is the
number of people who will be affected and how to remediate them after a new dam
destroys their traditional lifestyle. In this case it is easy to see how the bigger a dam is,
the more people it can displace. World Bank projects are often at such a large scale that
they ignore the specific needs of individuals at ground level; they focus on the technical
and statistical analysis at the expense of human misery and the environment. Big Dam
projects rarely improve the living standards of the people they displace- rather, all of that
new regulated water and power gets sent to still viable (e.g. not flooded) farmland and
urban centers. One of the main points addressed by the World Commission on Dams
(WCD) is the need for the World Bank to insist upon and follow through in enforcing
adequate resettlement plans for displaced populations. Still- an institution of the World
Bank’s magnitude cannot easily peer into the internal workings of each country it extends
loans to.
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In the case of the 3,300 Big Dams that India built between its Independence in

1947 and 1995, only 54 were specifically studied by the Indian Institute of Public
Administration to see how many people the dams displaced. The average number of
people displaced by these 54 dams was 44,182 (Roy, 1999, p. 17). Roy notes that despite
the small size of this sample for extrapolating the total number of people displaced by all
the dams built (54 is only 1.6 percent of the 3,300 dams built in India during this period),
even if we drastically under-estimate the total, by pretending that on average only 10,000
people were displaced by each dam, the total would still be 33 million displaced people!
This figure is already under estimated by a factor of four. Then we have to consider how
many people the Indian government didn’t consider ‘project affected’ and didn’t include
in statistics of displaced people. Moreover, India has “no government records of how
many people have been displaced. India does not even have a national rehabilitation
policy” (Roy, 1999, p. ix). India is by no means the only developing nation where
displaced people from Big Dam development projects have slipped through the cracks or
actively been ignored. It is an example of the larger pattern where the World Bank’s
collaboration with State governments (made up of the wealthy elite of a country)
prioritizes imagined returns from technological projects over responsibly addressing and
managing the social problems they create.
India’s experience in resettling displaced refugees of its dams is a terrifying
example of how easily a government can cover up and ignore its own people through
loopholes over land titles and who counts as ‘project-affected’. The World Bank and IMF
offer no incentives or clear follow up procedures to ensure that governments will provide
for the all the people a new dam displaces (whether or not they hold titles to the land they
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live on). Unfortunately most of the people that are displaced for Big Dams in developing
countries are rural, often illiterate, indigenous communities. They don’t always hold title
to their lands since they may have been living there far before the government ever
decided ‘titles’ and deeds to land were necessary. Even if they do have their land rights,
their isolation from the policy workings of national governments means they are more
easily duped and cheated out of fair settlements- especially if they can’t read the
documents.
Even communities that have learned to fight by modern rules with land titles,
lawyers, and the media, consistently lose the fight to protect their lands from planned
dams. In Brazil, indigenous tribes in the Xingu River basin have been fighting plans for
the Belo Monte Dam since the 1980s. The dam is set to be the third-largest dam in the
world, after China’s Three Gorges Dam and the Brazilian-Paraguayan Itaipu Dam. It
would displace up to 40,000 people and submerge a rainforest-covered river basin
claimed to have four times the biodiversity of all of Europe (Windh, 2011, n.p.). Even the
Brazilian “constitution explicitly prohibits the displacement of ‘Indians’ from their
traditional lands”. Unfortunately, it also “provides for one convenient exception: when
the National Congress deems removal of people to be ‘in the interest of the sovereignty
of the country’” (Windh, 2011, n.p.). That’s a gaping loophole for any governmentsupported development project to take any land it wants to, regardless of human and
ecological costs.
In India, most of the ‘Adhivasi’ (indigenous) communities displaced by Big Dam
development aren’t even considered ‘project-affected’ so they aren’t entitled to any
settlement or rehabilitation help. Building dams that displace only invisible people- who
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never show up in statistics or require government money to resettle- is convenient for Big
Dam developers. Is it a coincidence then that Adhivasis and Dalits (untouchable castes,
literally ‘oppressed’ people), who make up 8 percent and 15 percent of India’s total
population respectively, make up about 60 percent of displaced populations from India’s
Big Dams? (Government of India (GOI) statistics, cited in Roy, 1999, p.18) Most of
these invisible populations end up in slums surrounding India’s urban centers, having lost
their ancestral land and their livelihoods. One villager displaced by the Bargi dam on the
Narmada River queried a documentary maker, “why didn’t they just poison us? Then we
wouldn’t have to live in this shithole and the government could have survived alone with
its precious dam all to itself” (Roy 1999, p.13).
There’s a cascading effect of displacement too. Displaced villagers who did have
land rights are often given parcels of replacement land, away from the dam site- whether
or not the land is already occupied! Thus, the original refugees may displace more
people. Land conflicts arise with villagers fighting each other over remnants of land that
may not even be agriculturally productive, because they have no way to direct their anger
at the real source of the problem: the government and the Big Dam builders. While land
settlements face issues of overcrowding or waterlogged, saline soils, cash settlements can
be even less dependable. Cash doesn’t provide the same lifeline that the displaced
villagers’ land on the river did. Traditionally, villagers could depend on the river for fish,
their crops for grains, and the forest, if all else failed. Being handed a wad of cash puts all
of a recently uprooted family’s eggs in one basket and puts them “a heartbeat away from
destitution” (Roy 1999, p. 53). Other consequences for the luckiest of the displaced who
receive aid at all can be: having their communities torn apart and resettled in different
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areas, having host communities be hostile to the newcomers, or even not speaking the
native language of the new region.
It’s clear that both the size of a dam and its distance from vast human settlements
are the main factors affecting displacement. Big Dams are bound to displace large groups
of traditional river communities in developing countries. At this scale, when dams are
dozens of meters high, Roy argues “it is just not possible for a state administration, any
state administration, to carry out the rehabilitation of a people as fragile as this, on such
an immense scale. It’s like using a pair of hedge clippers to trim an infant’s fingernails”
(Roy 1999, p. 55). Big Dams could be replaced by many smaller irrigation schemes to
provide equivalent water to farming communities without this kind of mass displacement.
Politicization: Hierarchy of water rights
An in-depth study of the World Bank’s history of funding Big Dams reveals what at
first appear to be numerous unintentional negative effects of Big Dams on the people they
were supposedly built to help. Many of them are already covered above. Many of them
could possibly be considered accidental flaws, like displacement of river communities or
consequences of rising water tables on agriculture (if ignorance and neglect deserve the
term ‘accidental’). Still, there might be reasonable doubt suggesting that the Western
development model is just sadly misguided in its approach to Big Dam development, not
mal-intentioned. When focus shifts to considering who actually benefits from Big Dams,
doubt is erased. Clearly the people benefiting are not the millions of people displaced by
the dams… so who does their sacrifice benefit?
It’s not the people the dam was originally built to help- certainly. Most dams are
built with the stated purpose of solving drinking water deficiencies in rural areas. “Of the
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one billion people in the world who have no access to safe drinking water, 855 million
live in rural areas” (Serageldin, 1994, p. 4). Roy explains that the main reason dams
cannot be built to serve this need is that “the cost of installing an energy-intensive
network of thousands of kilometers of pipelines, aqueducts, pumps, and treatment plants
that would be needed to provide drinking water to scattered rural populations is
prohibitive.” She emphasizes, “Nobody builds Big Dams to provide drinking water to
rural people” (Roy, 1999, p. 76).
These Big Dams are also not benefiting small farmers who need irrigation water.
As mentioned above, year round irrigation actually separates small farmers from selfsustaining methods of providing for their families, and makes them dependent on crop
prices and the market. Small farmers are also subjected to the dam management’s
monopolized control of the price of water, which crops they are allowed to grow, and
how much irrigation water they are allowed to use. Thus, Big Dams are increasingly seen
as ‘undemocratic’ because “they’re a guaranteed way of taking a farmer’s wisdom away
from him. They’re a brazen means of taking water, land, and irrigation away from the
poor and gifting it to the rich. Their reservoirs displace huge populations of people,
leaving them homeless and destitute” (Roy, 1999, p. 14).
Roy talks about this ‘gifting’ of water rights to the rich in light of India’s Big
Dams that she researched on the Narmada River. The politicization of the Big Dams’
water management led to major agricultural companies and luxury resorts receiving water
before thirsty rural villages or small farmers ever received a drop. In the case of the giant
Sardar Sarovar dam on the Narmada River, the dam’s stated purpose was to bring
drinking water to 40 million villagers in the state of Gujarat. Before the dam was even
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built, the water had already been promised to rich sugar corporations, hotels, water parks,
and wealthy urban centers. These groups would all receive as much water as they needed
before it could ever reach the rural villages that need drinking water (Roy, 1999, p. 74). It
is this obvious transfer of water rights from the poor to the rich that makes it easy for
critics of the Western development model to accuse the World Bank and the governments
of developing countries of deliberately taking water from the poor to deliver to the rich- a
very clearly not accidental widening of the wealth gap. Big Dams don’t raise living
standards of the poor people they are said to target, but ruthlessly and deliberately
propagate mass inequity. Roy makes the severe comparison that “Big Dams are to a
nation’s “development what nuclear bombs are to its military arsenal. They’re both
weapons of mass destruction. They’re both weapons governments use to control their
own people. Both twentieth-century emblems that mark a point in time when human
intelligence has outstripped its own instinct for survival” (Roy 1999, p. 80).
While comparing dams to bombs is too extreme, the idea that technology has
exceeded our natural instincts to preserve life reaches beyond humanity. We’re throwing
our own kind under the bus, certainly, but all other species are perceived as worth even
less in the hierarchy of rights. Scientists’ last-ditch efforts to impress the importance of
biodiversity led to the Endangered Species Act (ESA) (1973) enacting drastic policy
change in the United States. For the first time in U.S. history, animals endanger of
extinction took priority over most human development goals. A central area of conflict
regarding the ESA was in water controversies during times of drought. In the Klamath
River basin in the Pacific Northwest, conflicts over water rights came to a head in the dry
summers of 2001 and 2002. The Bureau of Reclamation had promised the family farmers
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of the basin eternal irrigation rights but the dwindling salmon populations took priority
under the ESA. While the small farmers, fish biologists, and Native American groups
who relied on fisheries fought over who had primary rights to the water, one culprit was
largely ignored. Four major dams on the Klamath River were at least partially responsible
for the water shortages. Worst of all, these dams didn’t produce enough electricity to be
worth continuing to run, so they only remained on the river because of the expense
involved in tearing them down (Miller, 2009, n.p.). The fact that even the groups affected
by the water shortages were blaming each other rather than focusing on these dams shows
just how engrained dams have become in politicizing water rights.

•

The high cost of aid
Big Dam projects are usually only possible for developing countries to build with

the help of foreign loans. The World Bank is overly happy to comply and it’s necessary
to question why. It’s not because the Bank is altruistic, surely- so how does handing out
massive loans benefit them? Joseph Stiglitz’s criticisms of the way international financial
institutions have instituted globalization and market fundamentalism in developing
countries carries special weight because he was the former chief economist of the World
Bank. In “Globalism’s Discontents”, like in Deborah Moore’s essay, Stiglitz isn’t
critiquing the inherent concept of development, just the way these institutions implement
it. As he puts it, foreign aid is making a problem into a crisis: taking people in developing
countries from low-productivity jobs to unemployment when foreign ‘hot’ money pulls
out suddenly.
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It’s important to remember that the countries of East Asia were successfully

managing their own economic growth through market regulations when Keynesian
economics dominated. When the U.S. began to push neoliberal policies of liberalization,
the influence of the Western-backed IMF and World Bank caused a parallel shift in
developing countries. De-regulating the market prevented equitable diffusion of profits,
instead focusing wealth in the hands of the few at the top. While Stiglitz and Moore seem
to believe that the IMF and World Bank are unwise to the detrimental effects that
liberalization has had on developing markets, it cannot be an accident.
The Bank is not necessarily at fault for offering high interest loans- that’s
typically what banks do. They are at fault for offering debilitating, large loans that
developing countries can’t hope to pay back and for jumping into such agreements before
considering the full costs to the developing country’s economy and people. Once again, it
is the scale of Big Dam development projects, and their accompanying astronomical costs
that prevents developing countries from ever escaping the cycle of debt and dependence
on foreign aid. It makes sense why the World Bank is eager to jump into large loan
agreements when the “international dam industry is worth $20 billion a year” (McCully
1998, p. 274). After all, all banks must make a profit. But banks also have a responsibility
to offer loans that careful analyses have shown the borrower will be capable of paying
back. Multilateral international banks like the World Bank and IMF have a multiplied
responsibility in this regard, since their loans are supposed to facilitate the development
of entire nations, not bankrupt them.
The argument for “debt relief” to forgive development loans in the Third World
insists that the debt cycle reinforces Western dominance over developing countries. “The
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interests of affluent countries, investors and multinational corporations that benefit from
the status quo are represented by the major multilateral lenders, the IMF and World
Bank” (Makwana, 2006). One report advocating for debt relief mentions how
international lenders imposing liberalization on markets through Structural Adjustment
Programs (SAPs) “compounds the net flow of resources out of developing countries
whilst also facilitating the transfer of control over domestic resources and services to
foreign interests” (Makwana, 2006). While it is morally acceptable for international
banks to profit from repayments with interest, it is unequivocally wrong for them to
represent the interests of their lenders by facilitating the exploitation of developing
countries.
It is also reprehensible for the World Bank to approve project loans before the
Ministry of the Environment has even completed its impact reports. In an “internal
review of 50 bank-financed dam projects, evaluators found that only 13 of 50 were
considered acceptable projects, the remainder being unacceptable or requiring extensive
remedial action” (Moore, 1998, n.p.). In the case of the Sardar Sarovar in India, “whose
reservoir displaces people in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, but whose benefits go to
Gujarat” the Bank had cleared a $450 million loan two years before the Ministry of
Environment cleared the project (Roy, 1999, p. 28). Perhaps they jumped the gun
because they knew the project would be approved, as it’s almost impossible for
environmental consultants to adequately critique dam projects without losing their jobs.
The Bank wouldn’t continue to employ people who kept refusing their wishes- it would
be bad business. Also, “between 1947-1994 the World Bank’s management had
submitted 6,000 projects to the executive board. The board hadn’t turned down a single
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one… Terms like ‘moving money’ and ‘meeting loan targets’ suddenly begin to make
sense” (Roy, 1999, p. 29). The bank’s priority is passing loans, not choosing projects that
will truly help to reduce poverty and raise living standards in developing countries.
Thus, even if the Ministry approves the project (which it always does, without
fail) there’s no institutionalized way to follow through after a project is built to see if they
are actually achieving what they set out to do, “whether or not the (always phenomenal)
costs were justified, or even what the costs actually were” (Roy, 1999, p. 16). The Bank
benefits from a system of “global governance without global government” (Stiglitz,
2002) because only the World Bank is regulating the World Bank’s actions. Financial
institutions play to the interests of the wealthy who govern the policies of developing
countries without democratic accountability. The World Bank’s goal to further progress
in the Third World is an empty promise: “how can you measure progress if you don’t
know what it costs and who has paid for it?” (Roy, 1999, p. 16)
The financial burden on developing economies to pay back these weighty loans is
heightened by projects running far over their estimated costs from original loan
agreements. An analysis of World Bank dam projects between 1993-1998 show that the
projected boon to the host country’s economy was always overly optimistic in terms of
observed returns and the actual building costs were “40 percent higher than initial
estimates” (Moore, 1998). Not included in this 40 percent underestimation of dam costs
are the astronomical costs of drainage projects, which are left out of the tab for irrigation
systems because they make the dam costs seem prohibitively expensive. “David Hopper,
the World Bank’s vice-president for South Asia [in the late 1990s], has admitted that the
Bank does not usually include the cost of drainage in its irrigation projects… because it
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costs five times as much to provide adequate drainage as it does to irrigate the same
amount of land. It makes the cost of a complete project appear unviable” (Roy, 1999, p.
70). The critical link missing here is if the project’s costs appear unviable, they are! The
World Bank plays a manipulative game by giving a separate loan for irrigation projects
that they know will eventually have to be followed by a drainage project once
waterlogging and salinization of soils set in.
The dramatic social and environmental costs of Big Dams are relatively unknown
(or at least not considered fully). Building costs are astronomically high and typically
more expensive than project estimates. Finally, large-scale dams tend to break down
more often than predicted. Irrigation benefits are already controversial because of the
social consequences to farmers and soil degradation. When the huge extra cost of
drainage is incorporated- the projects costs become even more unwieldy. The benefits of
the regulated water reach rich agricultural monopolies and luxury resorts before they
reach villages that lack safe drinking water. The last straw is that some of these Big Dams
actually require more energy to run than the electricity they produce (Dharmadhikary,
1995, p. 141)! If all these claims still seem unbelievable, take a look at the host of
problems that faced the first of India’s many dams built on the Narmada: the Bargi Dam,
built in 1990. It cost ten times more than its budget and submerged three times more land
than engineers predicted. A total of 162 villages were submerged without warning (when
estimates only predicted evacuating 101 villages) (McCully 1998, p. 87). 114,000 people
were displaced and most ironically: “the Bargi dam irrigates only as much land as it
submerged in the first place- and only 5 percent of the area that its planners claimed it
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would irrigate” (Roy 1999, p. 36). Clearly Big Dams don’t provide enough drinking
water, irrigation or energy to be worth their astronomical costs.
Available alternatives to Big Dams
We, as a global population, have outgrown Big Dams. Or rather, Big Dams have
outgrown us. The consequences of building dams at such a massive scale are too
destructive to inflict on any population in any part of the world. Luckily, the options are
not limited to Big Dams or no regulated water storage whatsoever. Small-scale
hydropower projects, both for regulated water and energy, continue to grow in
developing countries with gradually increasing financial support from state governments.
Projects that incorporate local knowledge of the peculiarities of place, adapt to scale, and
include local people in decision-making can transform the mainstream development
model. These alternative methods focus on direct benefits of hydropower projects to the
communities where they are built and beyond, rather than focusing on energy statistics
and liters of water delivered. Popular power and pluralistic decision making are keys to
making sure that the interests of one group don’t dominate or spur a project that would be
detrimental to others. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, spent most of his
tenure pushing development projects for the “Greater Good of the Nation”. During this
time, “dam building grew to be equated with nation building’ (Roy 1999, p. 13). But even
Nehru, who once wholeheartedly believed in the capability of Big Dams to spur national
progress, came to regret supporting what he referred to as “the disease of gigantism”. He
admitted that India, like much of the developed Global North, has been deluded in
thinking that Big Dams will bring real change for the majority. Building Big Dams has
become more about showing off a symbol of progress and development to the rest of the
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world than about addressing water needs. “The small irrigation project, the small
industries, and the small plants for electric power… will change the face of the country
far more than half a dozen big projects” (Nehru, 1958, cited in Roy, 1999, footnote 4).
While critiques of Big Dams have become more central in the public sphere of
development discussion during the last decade, the paradigm has yet to fully shift:
Predictions of a “steep decline in dam construction and other ‘mega-projects’ appear to
be misplaced. Neither the World Bank nor, evidence suggests, any of the other
international financial institutions, are withdrawing from infrastructural investments in
general…Even with current concerns about the rising costs of construction, opposition on
grounds of environmental and human damage, and poor rates of return on investments
(all of which increase risks and diminish profitability), consortia of private institutions
are increasingly providing the capital for the building and management of large-scale
projects” ( McDowell, 1996, pp. 2-3) When there are so many other less destructive
ways to continue developing water resources, it is unforgiveable for the Western
development model to continue to support the undemocratic Big Dam model.
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Chapter III: India and Nepal’s dynamic relationship in energy development and
the role of foreign aid
While the last section focused mostly on problems attributed to the scale of
hydropower development, this chapter will additionally begin to explore the other
important factor in moving toward our alternative definition of development: sovereignty
over decision-making and implementation of projects. To make a solid case for why
sovereign development is optimal for improving socio-economic conditions and reducing
scarcity, this chapter will concentrate on the case of Nepal, where I studied hydropower
development last year.
Hydropower is not only the biggest energy subject in Nepali politics today but
also one of the biggest economic and development topics. Much of the discussion in the
hydropower debate is centered around “how much and what Nepal should do to develop
its water resources” without first asking the important question, “what is it that the
development of water resources will do to Nepal” (Thapa, 1997, p. 37)? The wide
consensus is that Nepal needs hydropower to spur its economy and encourage industry
investments. But the same arguments have been recycling for decades. How to build: big
or small? How to help Nepal best: only allowing Nepali built projects or allowing for
international aid from the World Bank or room for Indian developers to invest? Within
this muddled conversation, “the critical linkages through which large scale exploitation of
water resources leads to more rapid economic growth and structural transformation of the
economy is hardly ever specified in detail” (Thapa, 1997, p. 35). There’s a missing link,
not only for the public who have had very little idea or choice in matters of hydropower
development, but for the policy makers and developers who seem to have tunnel vision,
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seeing only that more hydropower means more money. Because of the focus on
hydropower development in Nepal and the complexity of sharing water resources with
India, this is a perfect case study to explore in-depth the successes and pitfalls of dam
development in a developing country. This chapter specifically explores a brief history of
hydropower development in Nepal, and the problems that have arisen from attempting to
build joint energy projects with India and with the help of foreign aid.
The coming sections will help to explain why there is never enough electricity to
satisfy demand in Nepal and why plans for large hydropower projects have consistently
failed. Part of these project’s failures can be attributable to Nepal alone, because of
instability and corruption in the Nepali government, where leaders cycle in an out of
office with a frequency bordering on musical chairs. Government leaders looking for
kickbacks from awarding project licenses to the highest contracting bidder are often
undercut by the next person to come into power, thus sizable hydropower projects rarely
get off the ground. The political environment is so unstable that foreign investment is
also shaky and tends to fall apart- a characteristic problem in many developing countries.
Finally, one entity, the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) has a centralized monopoly
over production, generation and distribution of the entire national grid for electricity- an
effect of liberalization imposed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1984 (Pun,
2008, p. 6). If the monopoly control of electricity weren’t enough of a problem on its
own, NEA employees are additionally paid government salaries, so the company’s
overwhelming management failures and financial losses harm the government and the
public taxpayers, but not NEA. While Nepal clearly has its own fair share of obstacles
hindering development and proper management of existing hydropower, another major
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factor in Nepal’s failure to deliver adequate electricity and water to its people is
interference from foreign actors, primarily India.
Many of the case studies shared in the last section, critiquing Big Dam
development, illustrated the negative effects of Big Dams on India’s own development.
It’s true that the major populations of rural poor in India are often victims of
irresponsibly carried out development projects funded by foreign aid. The distinction to
make here is between the Indian government and its people. The government itself and
the wealthy urban centers of India can hardly be considered “Third World” anymore.
India is a rapidly growing economy and major exporter of agricultural and material goods
in the world market. Thus, India’s government is actually a foreign actor perpetuating in
other countries the same problems from development projects that its own people face.
India has a critical interest, for example, in the development of Nepal’s water resources,
since all of Nepal’s rivers eventually flow to India. The Indian government isn’t wrong to
want to be involved in this development- as a lower riparian, it has a stake in managing
these river flows. However, in any joint development projects undertaken by the two
countries to develop hydropower in Nepal, India is looking out for its own agenda first.
Nepal’s focus needs to shift toward promoting sovereign development in order to also
serve its own best interests.
History of Nepal-India joint hydropower and foreign aid funded projects
While Nepal’s multi-faceted history with India has on the whole been politically
smooth, when it comes to the sharing of water resources along rivers that flow through
both countries, India and Nepal have never found much to agree upon for long. A lack of
trust that both countries can agree on a fair deal is the primary issue. Their history of
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attempted joint projects deeply affects the Nepali government’s ability to make big
hydropower decisions. On the subject of joint projects with shared benefits in flood
control, electricity and controlled water for agriculture “the Nepali position [is]
schizophrenic: it is torn between hyped-up propaganda of imagined benefits and almost
Freudian undercurrents of buried misgivings" (Gyawali, 2001, pp. 6-7). What caused this
bad blood to build up between Nepal and India? What has gone so terribly wrong that
two countries with a shared goal for hydropower development cannot find a way to
cooperate?
Political controversies over water with India have been continuous since the 1960s,
beginning with two irrigation dams that were built in the ‘50s during King Mahendra’s
reign in Nepal. These first two bilateral agreements were for the Kosi dam(1954) and
Gandak project (1959). Both projects were designed to provide irrigation and flood
control benefits solely to India with small quantities of compensatory electricity for
Nepal. The Kosi project’s Kataiya Hydropower Plant, meant to provide 20 MW to Nepal,
only produced 13.6 MW sporadically because of high siltation. Gandak was rated to
produce 15 MW but regularly only generated 3-4 MW (Pun, 2008, p. 5). The Kosi and
Gandak projects set a precedent for larger future projects where benefits were unfairly
distributed to India. Moreover, these projects foreshadowed how in supposed cooperative
projects Nepal has been allowed to participate only as a passive bystander. “Kosi and
Gandak probably taught Nepal’s engineers very little except to have their eyes opened on
the inequities of project benefits and the value of Nepal’s rivers” (Pun, 2008, p. 5).
The Devighat hydropower, a 14 MW project proposed in 1984, was originally
supposed to be a Nepal-led project, with only financial aid contributions from India. The
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Prime Minister at the time decided that Devighat should be built with domestic resources
in order to “catalyze precious local skills and resources to demonstrate that Nepal, too,
has the capacity to build… But the Finance Ministry, already suffering from donor-driven
mentality” handed the project over to India instead (Pun, 2008, p. 5). Each attempt to
gain experience for Nepali engineers or contribute materials, in order to boost backward
linkages and increase local capacity-building, has been undercut by the Nepali
government itself selling off project rights to foreign countries.
Many larger hydropower schemes planned for Nepal have involved foreign loans not
just from India, but also from international development banks like the ADB and the
World Bank. Not only does the World Bank’s development pathway push Nepal to
accept big loans that increase its cycle of debt, Nepali hydropower activists estimate that
accepting foreign loans to build upon Nepal’s hydropower capacity is ten times more
expensive than building with Nepal’s money (D. Gyawali, Interview, May 2011; A.
Dixit, Interview, May 2011; R.S. Shrestha, Interview, May 2011). The reason for this
cost leap is easy to see: with foreign loans come foreign contractors and high expatriate
wages. If the machinery and contracting company come from other countries, as was the
case with Devighat, no industry within Nepal can benefit during the building process.
Nepal is only able to contribute stones and sand to its own hydropower development and
subject to obey all the rules and stipulations that the foreign institution might impose.
One example of this type of hugely expensive foreign project was the infamous Arun
III. It was proposed as a run-of-the-river project in a remote valley that required no
human resettlement, so “social and environmental issues did not form the bulk of the
Nepali activist agenda…With a 201 MW capacity (named ‘baby’ in contrast to the full
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402 MW version), it was not in itself a particularly high dam, except that the project
proposed to almost double the country’s total generation capacity in one go” (Gyawali &
Dixit, 2010, pp. 111). Arun III was simply a case of bad economics, at a cost of
$5,400/kW, which is “four times more than that of small plants built by the private
sector” in Nepal (Gyawali & Dixit, 2010, p. 109). Indignant over the steep costs of a
project that would mostly export energy to India, a group of Nepali activists formed the
Arun Concern Group (ACG) to demand project information that should already have
been public under the World Bank’s information policy. Thus, the Arun III controversy
brought to light the “failure of the Bank to explore alternatives and illustrated how the
Bank’s lack of transparency can undermine democratic institutions in borrowing
countries” (Udall, 1998, p. 410). Its illogical cost of $1 billion for only 201 MW,
combined with Nepali activists successfully bringing attention to how little the World
Bank looked into more cost-effective alternatives, eventually led the bank to pull its
funding for the project in 1995 (Pun, 2008, p. 6; Udall, 1998, p. 408). Suspiciously, the
decision to pull out barely preceded a planned review by the “World Bank Inspection
Panel to investigate whether the bank had violated its own guidelines for land
compensation, resettlement and environmental assessment on the project” (International
Rivers, n.d.). Unfortunately, the lessons of Arun III’s failure didn’t prevent India and
international banks from proposing (or Nepal from accepting) future financially and
socially prohibitive projects.
Even as Nepal’s government was focused on the Arun III conflict, it granted the
Australian-based company, Snowy Mountains Engineering Company (SMEC), a license
to build the 750 MW West Seti storage project, which planned to export 90 percent of the
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energy produced to India, along with most of the regulated water. West Seti is the most
prime example of a dam that should never have sparked controversy in Nepal as it should
never have been considered in the first place. It provides no backward linkages to boost
industry in Nepal since the contracting company is Australian. Most opportunities for
forward linkages are lost to India through exported electricity and irrigation water.
Moreover, the project would require 678 hectares of Nepali land for the transmission line
alone, and an additional 2,322 hectares for the reservoir and dam site. Over 9,000 people
would be displaced from their homes and lose their livelihoods directly, not to mention
the impact on fisheries on both sides of the dam (International Rivers, n.d.). Funding for
the project was initially provided by the ADB, “despite the project’s violations of the
ADB Environmental Policy, Involuntary Resettlement Policy and Public Communication
Policy… In 2010 a campaign by Kathmandu-based Water and Energy Users’ Federation
Nepal (WAFED) forced the ADB to pull out from the project for its failure to comply
with these policies” (International Rivers, n.d.). Despite the clear lack of benefits for
Nepal, the potential damages to local people and the environment, and unreliable
funding, the project stayed on the table for sixteen years before the Nepali government
finally canceled the agreement in 2011.
An even more infamous example of a dam project that has been contested since its
start is the Pancheshwar dam, outlined in the Mahakali Treaty of 1996. Rights over water
in the Mahakali River (called the Sarda River in India) were contested for the better part
of the 20th century, ever since the Sarda agreement of 1920 first outlined distribution of
its water between Nepal and India. While Nepal’s rights to the river water were
specifically defined as “4.25 cumecs of water in the dry season and 13 cumecs in the wet
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season”1, India’s share of the 650 cumecs that annually flow down the Mahakali were
unspecified (Gyawali & Dixit, 1999, p. 553) in the 1920 treaty. In a series of treaties
over the following decades, India was able to build the Sarda barrage and the Tanakpur
barrage, which both extended into Nepali territory and threatened to flood Nepali valleys
in order to save downstream villages in India. The final straw came when the Prime
Ministers of India and Nepal ratified the Mahakali Treaty in 1996 without a two-thirds
parliamentary majority. The treaty disastrously linked agreements over the Sarda and
Tanakpur barrages with a plan for a 315-meter high multi-purpose dam called the
Pancheshwar, to generate 6,480 MW of electricity, mostly for the benefit of India
(Gyawali & Dixit, 1999, p. 557). The dam’s reservoir would extend up to 65 km into the
Baitadi and Darchula districts of Western Nepal, capable of storing 6 billion cubic meters
of water for irrigation and flood benefits (although those two purposes require opposite
uses of the reservoir).
As entailed in the 1996 Mahakali Treaty, all the costs and benefits of the
Pancheshwar project would be split equally between the two countries, with Nepal
agreeing to sell part of its share of regulated water and energy to India based on its much
smaller need (Treaty of Mahakali, 1996; Gyawali & Dixit, 2001). At an estimated cost of
$2-4 billion dollars, a project of this epic proportion was, and continues to be, financially
unfeasible for Nepal. Nepal only has about 700 MW installed to date, and has struggled
to build even this limited capacity. Suddenly a project that could potentially quadruple
Nepal’s electricity capacity in one leap was agreed upon, without project reports or the
full agreement of the Nepali government. Moreover, the ‘equal’ benefits outlined in the

1

A cumec is a rate unit of one cubic meter per second.
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treaty were blurred by excluding “respective existing consumptive uses of the waters of
the Mahakali River”, which are skewed in India’s favor (Treaty of Mahakali, 1996).
One current joint project controversy is the Naumuri project (245MW), which India
plans to build in Nepal on the Rapti River and fund entirely. India wants only the
regulated water from the project, leaving all the electricity for Nepal. A supporter of this
project estimates the worth of the project as 6 billion rupees worth of free electricity for
Nepal and only ½ billion rupees worth of irrigation for India. Activists on the other, antiexport side of the argument agree that this deal is true but the estimated worth is not.
They claim “water is more valuable than electricity,” so if the electricity is worth 6
billion, the water is worth around 18 billion, because of the multiplier benefit in
agriculture. (R.S. Shrestha, Interview, May 2011; D. Gyawali, Interview, May 2011).
One economist vehemently denounced Naumuri as the worst possible project for Nepal if
all the regulated water is actually exported to India. The Terai plains desperately need
irrigation in the dry season and could produce at least three cash crops (meeting Nepal’s
yearly demand by 300 percent) with the regulated water from Naumuri. Another reason
to insist on Nepal keeping the regulated water benefits from this project is that building
Naumuri will make Nepal’s Sikta irrigation project below the new site, useless. If
Naumuri is built, there will not be enough water left in the Rapti River to support Sikta,
which is currently used for irrigation in the Terai. This is not a problem if Naumuri is
built for Nepal’s irrigation purposes, but leaves the drought-prone Terai even more
vulnerable if water is exported to India. Still, 245 MW of free electricity is almost a third
of Nepal’s entire current capacity. Would risking drought in the Terai possibly be worth
the free electricity? Some Nepalis say yes, and others violently disagree. It’s important to
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keep in mind one inherent inequality in this disagreement: Bureaucrats and hydrocrats
stand to gain a lot from get-rich-quick-now schemes, because of personal kickbacks from
licensing projects. Activists don’t stand to gain anything directly, only through what is
best for Nepal.
Of the dams shared in this brief history of foreign involvement in developing
hydropower in Nepal, the Kosi, Gandak, and Devighat dams are all relatively small, so
their damaging effects are mostly to the cooperative trust necessary for successful joint
projects between India and Nepal. Arun III, West Seti, and Pancheshwar are all examples
of projects that have failed to come to fruition, though plans for each dam continue to
cycle in development discussions. The Naumuri is one dam that is currently hotly
contested for its potential pros and cons in Nepal. While these dams represent only a
sampling of all the dams planned for Nepal or already built through cooperation with
India and funding from international lending institutions, they paint an accurate picture of
the trials that Nepal has faced in developing its water resources.
Positions on exporting hydropower
In defining the arbitrary ‘sides’ in the hydropower debate on how best to develop
Nepal’s water resources, it’s important to keep in mind that the basic argument is not
over whether or not hydropower is an appropriate development path for Nepal. “Even the
fiercest dam critics in Nepal do not say ‘No dams’! but rather ‘No bad dams’!” (Gyawali
& Dixit, 2010, p. 108) Defining what qualifies as a ‘bad dam’ is not a simple black-andwhite matter however. Although attempting to clarify the positions on hydropower
development will undoubtedly oversimplify the true discussion, it provides a necessary
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basis to understand the motivations for nation-led hydropower development versus the
benefits of utilizing foreign aid and exporting energy to India.
On one side of the hydropower debate are politicians, private developers dubbed
‘hydrocrats’, and the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), who want to increase power
capacity fast and now. On the other side are activists and hydropower experts who want it
done carefully with maximum benefit for Nepal. These central actors fall along a
spectrum of three basic positions on the issue of exporting project licenses to foreign
companies and energy to India. The first standpoint asserts that Indian companies should
be allowed to develop and export their own electricity in Nepal. Whatever is leftover,
Nepal should be grateful to have! People with this view fancy themselves to be realists by
acknowledging that India is too powerful a neighbor to exclude completely. The middle
position allows that Indian companies should receive contracts to build dams in Nepal
under the condition that all of Nepal’s electricity and regulated water needs are met
before any is exported to India. The final position advises leaving India out of the
equation entirely: Indian contractors shouldn’t get licenses to build projects and Nepal
should not export any energy to India. Advocates of this stance want jobs for Nepalis and
believe that all benefits of hydropower (from backward and forward linkages) are direly
needed in Nepal. They believe that while the water in the rivers may be a shared resource,
India has no right to the land through which it flows in Nepal, and attempting to
cooperate with such a powerful country will never work out to Nepal’s benefit.
Despite these misgivings, Indian companies are currently working on Nepal’s
three major rivers: the Karnali, the Gandakhi, and the Kosi. Since 70% of water in the
Ganges flows from Nepal (and 80% of that falls in three months during the monsoon),
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it’s clear why India wants to build dams and reservoirs to save and control water that
alternatively causes severe floods and droughts in Northern India. India is far more
interested in water than hydropower: as Kunda Dixit, the editor of The Nepali Times,
concisely put it, “India’s two interests in Nepal are political stability and water,” which
are inseparably linked (K. Dixit, Interview, May 2011). The Karnali Chisapani (10,800
MW) and Sapta-Kosi High Dam (3,000 MW) are two major projects currently considered
for export. Each will cost more than $1 billion (greater than Nepal’s annual budget) and
both projects would submerge Nepali roads, valleys and villages. The possible benefits
are still huge, but are they worth it?
The pro-export side says of course, and here’s why: With India’s financial
resources and building capacity Nepal can obtain more power just from their free
leftovers than it has the power to build on its own. Nepal can only get on its feet and
begin developing more domestic-funded hydropower with the boost from India’s projects
that will bring revenue to Nepal’s economy. For example, if India builds the Upper
Karnali project (900 MW), without Nepal putting any money in, it will receive 12 percent
of the energy (108 MW) (Pun, 2008, p. 7). The equivalent worth of 108 MW is about 13
billion Nepali rupees (G. Lal Pradhan, Interview, May 2011). The free energy could be
used to attract more industry and in turn lead to more hydropower development.
Moreover, the financial revenue from selling energy to India can be used to invest in
health, education and improving transportation access to rural areas of Nepal.
There are examples of past success with the international export model, too. Proexport hydrocrats cite Bhutan’s cooperative relationship with India. The much smaller
country, “with a population one-fiftieth of Nepal’s, [has] the current generating capacity
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of 1488 MW…twice that of Nepal” (Gyawali, 2010b), because of Indian-funded projects.
One successful Nepali private power producer claimed that Bhutan takes whatever
electricity it needs from these projects and sells the rest to India cheaply (50 pesa/kWh).
(G. Lal Pradhan, Interview, May 2011). In actuality, Bhutan doesn’t take all the energy it
wants: 80 percent of Bhutan’s electricity is exported to India, leaving only about 300MW
for Bhutan’s use. Still, more than 70 percent of Bhutan’s households have access to
electricity (Gyawali, 2010b), compared to only 40 percent in Nepal. Pro-export
proponents in Nepal tout the Bhutanese model of development and decry Nepal for
“wallowing in ‘emtpy nationalism’ and stirring ‘needless’ controversies over the
Mahakali Treaty” (Gyawali, 2010b). They believe that Nepal needs to stop dwelling on
what India is getting out of any given project and focus solely on the magnitude of
benefits for Nepal. The longer hydropower development stalls, the more money is
wasted, while the water in question flows to India freely. As one hydrocrat jokingly
asked, “shall we go to India and stop the rivers?” (G. Lal Pradhan, Interview, May 2011).
Another aspect of the pro-export argument is that Nepal needs something to
leverage with India. For example, agreeing to export more hydropower benefits could
ease the fuel crisis that currently plagues Nepal, since it cannot afford to import fuel from
India. Moreover, India could pulverize Nepal politically if it outright refuses to cooperate
on joint water resource projects. Less extreme supporters of the export model suggest that
Nepal needs to stop fighting India and focus more on “What can be done to get the best
benefits out of a deal with India?” (K. Dixit, Interview, May 2011).
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The contingent of people who fall in between the two extremes on the export issue
believe that Nepal can have it both ways: engage India to help develop its water resources
and still get maximum benefits for Nepal. The central idea is that Nepal can take
responsibility for deciding which projects to build, and then offer bids to contractors,
rather than waiting for foreign companies to approach Nepal with their own agendas. The
rush to get hydropower developed has led to Nepali leaders handing out licenses
carelessly and allowing India to define the terms. However, private contractors in India
can still invest in building dams in Nepal without associated agreements for exporting
energy if Nepali leaders would just be pickier about the projects they award licenses to.
“The problem is at the political level” because the rules are just not institutionalized to
make sure Nepal gets a fair deal (D. Ghimire, Interview, May 2011). With a more
thorough and balanced accounting process for choosing hydropower projects, contracting
companies can still get returns on their investments, while the benefits of energy and
water remain within Nepal. Eventually, after enough projects satisfy Nepal’s needs for
irrigation and electricity, Nepal can choose to export energy to India on its own terms.
Many advocates of this Nepal-first export position say that despite their position on
sharing water resources, they don’t blame India for how badly past treaties and projects
have ended up for Nepal. “India is looking out for the best deal for their country, and they
are supposed to! So why doesn’t Nepal do the same?” More blame is directed at the
leaders of the Nepali government, “who needs to be looking out for their motherland
instead of themselves” (R.S. Shrestha, Interview, May 2011).
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The last simplified position on exporting hydropower is the group that calls for
completely independent development. As one past Nepali minister of water resources
proclaimed, “India is part of the problem not the solution” (D. Gyawali, Interview, May
2011). Advocates of this view are not selfishly leaving India to suffer while hogging all
shared water resources. They simply acknowledge that Nepal is not the key to fulfilling
India’s energy and water needs. After all, Northern India alone has a 15,000 MW energy
deficit (A Dixit, Interview, May 2011). Since Nepal cannot possibly solve India’s energy
and water problems, developing hydropower independently will provide the most holistic
benefits to Nepal.
The central reason this positions purports that joint projects of any kind with India
will not be worthwhile for Nepal’s development is centered on the firm belief that Nepal
lacks the government management and political weight to carry out fair negotiations with
India. The two countries are at too disparate development stages for their relationship to
be mutually beneficial (a concept related to dependency theory). Rather, their attempts at
cooperation resemble the colonizer-colonized relationship characteristic of most topdown development decisions between the developed Global North and the developing
Global South. Nepal has plenty of reason to be wary of this power dynamic. India is
capable of manipulating the price of Nepal’s own electricity, to make a profit. In the
proposed West Seti project (750 MW) that collapsed in 2011, India refused to buy
electricity for more than 3 Indian rupees per unit. But in negotiations over how much
Nepal would need to pay in order to buy back some of that electricity during the dry
season, India refused to sell for less than 7 rupees per unit of electricity (D. Gyawali,
Interview, May 2011). As Prem Jung Thapa, a noted development economist, pointed
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out: “the raison d’etre of these [large-scale] projects is the revenue to be earned from
power sales to India. To me, and I believe to most other development economists, this
also makes it the raison d’etre for not investing in these projects” (1997, p. 44).
A final reason for the anti-export model is allowing India to build storage projects for
its own flood control and irrigation purposes will never be a ‘fair’ deal for Nepal. Even if
Nepal’s own irrigation needs are ever completely fulfilled, Nepal will still “not [be] very
anxious to import floods from Bangladesh and India” (D. Gyawali, Interview, May
2011). The reservoirs created to store regulated water will inundate Nepali land. “Dams
don’t stop floods, they create more floods…Nepal building large storage dams in the
hills, for flood control, is tantamount to Nepal importing the seasonal floods of the lower
riparians as permanent features of its landscape… especially because India does not want
to pay for it” (D. Gyawali, Interview, May 2011).
Central themes of Nepal’s hydropower controversy
•

Downsides of foreign aid

Before studying in Nepal, I had very little idea of how foreign aid (at least in terms of
grants, that don’t incur national debt) could be anything but positive for a developing
country. I was ignorant of the "extent of institutional distortion that donor policies [can]
induce in recipient societies" (Gyawali, 2001, p. 7). Foreign aid in Nepal traditionally
comes tied to other countries’ agendas, which strips Nepal of its capacity to make
sovereign development decisions. The main issue is that “beneficiary countries give
money conditionally: ‘if you do this, you’ll get this’” (D. Gyawali, Interview, May 2011).
Nepal often gets pushed and pulled between India, China, and the U.S.’s desires, as a
small country between three powerful giants. The U.S. is considered Nepal’s ‘sky
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neighbor’ because it polices the entire world (D. Gyawali, Interview, May 2011). This
analogy to ‘policing’ Nepal through offering foreign aid is similar to another Nepali
political expert’s assertion that “foreign aid is the replacement for sending in the
marines!” (C.K. Lal, Personal communication, May 2011). Foreign countries attempting
to control Nepal’s development decisions through aid hinders political stability as well as
keeping Nepal financially dependent.
Foreign aid has also thoroughly embroiled the construction-heavy paradigm of the
modernization development model in Nepal. Nepal learned to adopt the U.S. model of
water management: “engineers [keep] aloof from people. The style excludes users from
decision-making… little attention [is] paid to local management practices (Dixit, 2002, p.
48). The paradigm was copied from the west, but the irony is, many projects that Nepal
would like to emulate were sovereign-led projects. For example, the Hoover Dam in the
United States was built with the explicit purpose of providing jobs during the Great
Depression. The link to understanding why the Hoover Dam was so successful is
missing, but the emphasis on construction remains. Unfortunately, “a development
strategy that promotes growth first and only then deals with human misery is not
sustainable” (Ghani, 2011).

•

An unlevel playing field
People on all sides of the hydropower debate have to acknowledge the inherent

inequality involved in joint projects with India. Even Gyanendra Lal Pradhan, who is one
of Nepal’s leading private power producers for export, admitted that Nepal’s diplomatic
capacity (as well as financial and technical capacity) is not up to par to negotiate to
negotiate a fair deal with India. (G. Lal Pradhan, Interview, May 2011; D. Ghimire,

Berry

75

Interview, May 2011). The government trying to force deals that don’t benefit the Nepali
public has been a source of contention for the last two decades at least: “After 1990, one
of the main reasons for the downfall of the successive governments in Nepal has been the
water related issues especially with India” (Bisht, 2010, n.p.). The disastrous Mahakali
Treaty (1996) that Nepal’s prime minister signed without consulting public opinion has
led to “such a nationalistic fervor that when people talk about treaty with India especially
on water and hydropower issues, the prompt comment is “desh bechne” or selling of
motherland” (Bisht, 2010, n.p.). One of the main problems for Nepal, as the poorer and
weaker nation, is that it doesn’t have a lot of power to name the price for sharing its water
wealth. “Nepal’s ability to extract a fair price from India is severely restricted by several
factors. Unlike Middle-Eastern oil, electricity is not an internationally trade-able
commodity with an identifiable market price. With India being the sole buyer as well as
joint partner in the venture, it is anybody’s guess how this price will be determined”
(Thapa, 1997, p. 44).

•

Government corruption
Government politicians and hydrocrats like Gyanendra Lal Pradhan are on the

side that decisions need to be made quickly and put into action; there is more cost on lost
opportunities from waiting than to just move ahead with construction (A. Chitrakar,
Interview, May 2011). After meeting Gyanendra, a charismatic and extremely optimistic
fellow, he almost had me convinced that the Nepali people are so desperate for
electricity, the only right thing to do is to develop as much power as possible— no matter
who is building or getting the most profit from the project—just to relieve Nepal’s
misery. With a step back and some alternative perspectives, it becomes clear that this
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method makes perfect sense for cabinet ministers and private power producers because
it’s the only way they benefit. Ministers are in and out of the Nepali government so
quickly that if they don’t sign off on projects quickly, they’ll never see personal payoff.
“Playing the blame game of one-upmanship, [politicians] have chosen to measure their
success in the size and number of licenses awarded even if they are purely for export and
would do nothing to end load shedding in Nepal” (Gyawali, 2010a). Activists who won’t
benefit at all from kick backs and licenses to Indian companies, also believe that action
needs to be taken now, but that everything should be done carefully- contracts shouldn’t
be rushed without making sure that Nepal will benefit first and foremost. The playing
field for this debate isn’t exactly level. In international discussions, “attempts to introduce
social and environmental concerns into the research agenda were rebuffed as
‘negativism’, while the research as structured without considering these issues was billed
as ‘forward-looking exercise about development’” (Gyawali, 2010a).

•

Lack of consideration for alternatives
In the same minority position as the vocal activists who ask for environmental and

humanitarian considerations before building giant dams in populated river valleys, are the
people who suggest Nepal look at other alternatives for development. The money for the
$2-4 billion Pancheshwar project could do wonders for Nepal if invested in education or
improving healthcare, but these development alternatives are not considered. "In public
discourse, there is almost a conspiracy of silence when it comes to practices in water
management that are alternatives to the high dam model (Gyawali, 2001, p. 9). What
activists worry about is that “with a commitment to undertake water resources Project X,
there will always be less donor funds available to Nepal for other purposes than without
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Project X. If certain donors or other parties offer concessional funds to Nepal tied
specifically to Project X, not being available for anything else, then we should be doubly
wary about discovering whose interests are being primarily served by Project X” (Thapa,
1997, p. 37).
The argument in favor of water resources-led development is hard to fight with
suggestions to consider other investment options. Hydropower offers an array of benefits
that are both more immediate and more moneymaking than investments in education or
sanitation and healthcare. The main points put forth in the water-led development model
are the benefits to agriculture stimulated by irrigation development, industrial production
stimulated by reliable/cheap power, new power intensive industries, water-powered
transport, environmental benefits due to reduced need for wood fuel and hydro-carbon
based energy use, and most controversially: export revenues to India.

•

Why big is bad
A central problem caused by the Western development model’s emphasis on

large-scale projects is that Nepal’s economy “cannot tolerate billion dollar mistakes”
(Thapa, 1997, p. 37). Cautious critics warn that big projects like the re-vamped Arun III,
Pancheshwar, and Karnali Chisapani put too many eggs in one basket. While on one
hand, if successful, these types of projects could double and triple Nepal's energy
capacity, on the other hand smaller and more spread out projects are less susceptible to all
fail at one time. If some fail, others are left, and they aren't as expensive! At an average
cost of $2000/kW (a figure that incorporates investment cost, transmission cost, and
maintenance) hydropower is an expensive undertaking with risks of physical obstacles,
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such as earthquakes and floods, and long implementation time (D. Gyawali, Interview,
May 2011). As the size of the project increases, logically so do all of these factors.
Even Gyanendra Lal Pradhan, the private power producer who usually takes the
side of encouraging big project deals with India, said that the much contested,
Pancheshwar project “is beyond imagination! [India and Nepal] don’t like each other. We
can’t build a huge joint project together! We have to start small and build good blood.”
(G. Lal Pradhan, Interview, May 2011). If a project of Pancheshwar’s proportion did
come under construction, all of Nepal’s finances would be tied up in it. Even if it turned
out as a huge success and faced no obstacles during construction (which is highly
unlikely due to the high silt content of Himalayan rivers), it would take a decade or more
to be up and running. In the meantime, Nepal would still be facing an energy crisis and
have less funds to invest in other areas.
Many hopes rest on hydropower to become Nepal’s “passport out of poverty”,
which results in the pressure to build big and quick. This view has become dogma for
successive governments, with politicians luring support in campaigns with promises of
intangible hydro-dollars boosting industry so that Nepal will no longer be the underdog to
powerful India. “The view that Nepal could become a rich country riding on the back of
one or two mega hydro-power generation projects, such as Chisapani on the Karnali or
Pancheswar on the Mahakali, has become firmly entrenched both in popular perceptions
as well as in more learned policy discussions about an appropriate national development
strategy for Nepal” (Gyawali, 2001, p. 35). For all of Nepal’s political instability,
including a recent communist revolution and the massacre of the royal family, throughout
the tumult, the goal of transforming Nepal into a wealthy hydropower nation has
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remained a high priority on every government’s bucket list. Some people joke that
“poverty is Nepal’s biggest asset (since it seems to attract so much foreign aid) and
hydropower is its biggest problem (since it has let to so much conflict and bad political
blood, including the splitting of political parties as happened with the Mahakali Treaty
with India regarding the Pancheswar high dam)” (Gyawali & Dixit, 2010, p. 107).
In the end, it is this political in fighting within Nepal that has truly stalled all
significant projects from coming to fruition. None of these opposing sides can be
successful in building water resource projects in Nepal while they are busy fighting each
other. A change in focus is necessary, from arguing over who is right to collaborating
about what needs to change for cooperation with India to be successful. The first things I
heard in this line of thought were still centered on what India has to do, not accepting any
responsibility for Nepal: mostly that India needs to accept the huge irrigation and flood
control benefits from dam projects and be willing to pay for them. The easy way out is to
say that India not a good neighbor because Nepal is weaker. But Nepal can take action by
being more careful about the contracts it enters into with India, and being more steadfast
about putting forth what’s best for Nepal. Unfortunately, the adjustments required to
move toward a responsible process for engaging in cooperative contracts with India are
not easy to pinpoint. The problem is “not in the laws themselves” but in the
“implementation of, and compliance with, these laws” (Gyawali & Dixit, 2010, p. 106).
Nepali law already requires large dam projects to pass by a two-thirds parliamentary
majority, which is a lengthy licensing process. The instability of the government and
corruption of its leaders are mostly to blame for allowing shoddily thought out dam
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projects that don’t benefit Nepal to receive licenses. Luckily, attempting to find better
ways to include India is not the only option for Nepal in hydro-resource development.
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Chapter IV: Alternatives to the Western development model: Sovereign-led
hydropower development in Nepal
Decades of foreign aid have left Nepal with the typical inferiority complex
instilled by the Western development model. The sad conclusion that Nepal cannot
develop its own water resources effectively, independent of India or the help of the
World Bank, is fortunately false. Nepal has all the resources and tools for sovereign-led
development, applicable to multiple scales of hydropower. There is no single easy
method for hydropower development- in fact this cookie cutter thinking is at the root of
the problem with the currently dominant development model. It is incredibly important to
focus on scale in any discussion of appropriate development- but not necessarily to focus
on one scale to the exclusion of all others (the way the Big Dam model does).
While the actual physical construction approach may vary across scale and
country based on appropriate context, the basic principles of nation-led development
apply across the board. Inherent by definition, sovereign development schemes do not rob
a country of its resources in order to benefit the economies of foreign nations. In this
way, they address the basic responsibility of any development project to focus on the
direct needs of people in the project’s host country. Nation-centric development can also
provide room for increased participatory decision-making and utilization of national
banks, contractors and engineers, since the funding for any project is not tied to foreign
agendas. The nation-led model of development is superior to the modernization model
touted by the World Bank because of this focus on local capacity building and addressing
community needs.

Berry

82
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first to explore alternatives to the

construction-centric foreign aid model for hydropower development, which are rapidly
gaining recognition in Nepal. Secondly, this chapter attempts to prove that these solutions
are viable across scale and country boundaries, without falling prey to the blanket
approach characteristic of the Western development model. In order to exemplify several
approaches to nation-led development, this chapter will focus on four specific case
studies in Nepal. The key that links these cases is their cooperative nature: none of these
approaches to improving Nepal’s hydropower situation exclude options for any of the
others, and each is appropriate in different settings. The first two case studies are
examples of ‘communitization’: local management of hydropower by a community
group. One study explores how community management is applicable to improving
electricity access in peri-urban, fringe communities that lack infrastructure to connect to
the national grid. The other illustrates how the same management techniques apply to
small, rural villages through building and managing their own micro-hydropower
stations, with subsidized funding from the state government. While communitization is
mostly applicable at a small-scale level, a third case study exemplifies how reliance on
private sector investors within Nepal can utilize Nepali banks for loans, Nepali materials
and Nepali expertise for medium-sized projects (10-100MW). Private sector investment
is especially important for backward linkage benefits in the process of building
hydropower. A fourth case study demonstrates how Nepal can fund its own ‘Big Dams’
(100MW+) where large-scale projects are necessary to address high electricity and
irrigation demands. This last case is of a public sector, state-managed dam, involving
participatory mechanisms to allow public investment shares. Though Big Dams
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necessitate higher social and environmental costs, the benefit of the nation-led model
over the Western approach is in revenue returning to the local communities directly
affected by the dam.

Case studies of sovereign development in Nepal

•

National Association of Community Electricity-Users Nepal (NACEUN)
On the polar opposite end of the development spectrum from complex debates

over Indo-Nepal joint projects to develop Big Dams, is the unassuming movement for
‘communitisation’- to bring electricity to rural Nepal through local management and
distribution. Unsurprisingly, most big hydropower decisions for improving Nepal’s
electricity capacity are based on demand growth in cities and the problem of
‘loadshedding’. The population affected by loadshedding, however, is the minority 40
percent of the population who have access to electricity at all. The other 18 million
people in the country live in rural areas where the national grid for electricity doesn’t
reach, and are hardly considered in most hydropower development decisions.
To address the electricity needs of this ignored population, Dilli Ghimire
established the Nepal Association of Community Electricty-Users Nepal (NACEUN) in
2005, after years of lobbying for community electricity rights in the government. The
organization’s goal is to provide electricity in rural areas through connection to the
national grid or by building independent micro-hydropower plants that supply enough
electricity for just a few villages. It also acts as a pressure group to get rights for rural
electricity distribution from the Nepal Electricty Authority (NEA). Prior to NACEUN’s
work, the NEA had a monopoly in producing, distributing and managing national
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electricity. NEA is a centralized, top-down company that lacks accountability for
managing electricity theft and huge transmission losses. NACEUN, on the other hand, is
a grassroots approach from the bottom-up, and promotes local participation in
hydropower development through community management. Dilli Ghimire has been
working on this process of ‘communitisation’ since 1997, and struggled for six years
before any laws passed to make way for rural electrification in Nepal.
From 1997 on, Ghimire went to planning commissions, NEA, and government
ministries to lobby for rural rights to electricity. His perseverance led to a verbal
agreement allowing the sale of electricity in bulk to village groups in ’98. At the time, the
terms and conditions were that the cost of micro-hydel projects would be split fifty-fifty
with the government and individual communities. When the ’98 verbal agreement didn’t
transfer to the new authority figures in ’99 (remember that Nepal’s government has
frequent leadership changes), Ghimire made the decision to persevere in lobbying the
ministries. The first success was in 1999, when the government started to allocate funds
to the Rural Electrification Program (3.5million rupees/year). Ghimire also proposed 19
village distribution committees (VDCs) in ’99, continued to build fifty-fifty infrastructure
projects, and lobbied for bulk rights and wholesale managing of electricity from ’98 to
2003 (D. Ghimire, Interview, May 2011). Finally in 2003, Dipak Gyawali, the new
minister of water resources, responded positively to Ghimire’s lobbying, resulting in the
passing of a set of Rural Electrification by-laws. It took Dipak Gyawali and Ratna Sansar
Shrestha, a hydro resource economist who was working in the water ministry at the time,
27 drafts of the “community electricity by-laws” (2003) to get passed (D. Gyawali,
Interview, May 2011). Through their persistence and strategic prioritizing of the by-laws
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on every discussion list, they laid the groundwork and South Lalitpur became the first
rural area cooperative able to buy electricity in bulk and supplies those first 19 VDCs to
this day.
The next line of work for Ghimire was lobbying to reduce the community’s share
of the fifty-fifty plan. Not only is it difficult to prepare 50 percent of capital cost for a
micro-hydro in rural communities, many people thought it was unfair that they had to pay
at all when government electrified urban areas for free. In 2004, Minister of Finance, Dr
Prakash Chandra Lohan, reduced the community portion to 20 percent, resulting in
Nepal’s current 80/20 fund for rural electrification. NACEUN currently addresses
electricity generation (in very rural areas without grid access: building micro-hydro) and
distribution (buying bulk electricity from NEA to be distributed locally). However, its
main priority is in building infrastructure to connect villages to the national grid. Now,
seven years after NACEUN’s beginning, there are 207 rural cooperatives in 47 districts
that buy in bulk and distribute electricity. 146,000 households have been electrified by
NACEUN and the 20/80 rural electrification program, and in another 1.5 years- 97,000
more households will be electrified from projects that are currently on-going (D.
Ghimire, Interview, May 2011). A whopping 12 percent of total households that NEA
provides electricity to are a result of this rural infrastructure and community management
program. Best of all, NACEUN is accessible to people of the lowest financial strata in
Nepal: the organization charges only two rupees each year per household in the 207
cooperatives and a thousand a year from the actual electricity cooperative in member
fees- all of which goes to support the organization.
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A huge part of NACEUN’s strength is based on how many people it can reach

without building extensive dams. In fact, a large portion of NACEUN’s work is focused
entirely on management rather than construction. Most issues with hydropower at the
large, government scale tie back to the idea that Nepal is “not a poor country, but a
poorly managed one” (B. Tulandhar, Interview, May 2011). NEA has ignored all
research about leaks and pilferage (when people illegally hook wires into electricity lines
to pilfer power) and thus power wasted can be beyond 70% in present systems! (D.
Gyawali, Interview, May 2011). Community management schemes curtail losses by
introducing double accounting (first from NEA, then through the community groups) to
stretch Nepal’s existing electricity to reach more people. The community management
groups have more at stake than NEA employees, who are paid steady government
salaries. The community’s best interests are served by responsible management in
distribution in order to make back their investment in bulk electricity.

•

Simigaau: a rural village’s micro-hydropower
Simigaau is a hill village in the Dolakha District of Nepal, cradled against the

Himalayas to the North and surrounded by steep canyons with rapidly flowing glacial
rivers. There are only about 90 families living in Simigaau today, as a result of outward
migration to cities in search of jobs, education, and a more comfortable lifestyle. Basic
technology that Kathmandu has enjoyed for years has been slow in coming to Simigaau,
because of its isolation. However, in recent years the advent of cell phones, electricity,
and most recently, the possibility of a road (build for the Tamakhosi hydropower) are
increasing Simigaau’s accessibility to the rest of the country. Simigaau has a
community-built and run micro hydropower that produces 12-15 kW of electricity for the
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village on a daily basis. The run-of-the-river power station, which only diverts a small
fraction of the river’s water, provides enough electricity for every family in the village to
have light from 6pm to 6am, in the absence of daylight. Moreover, if Simigaau is ever
connected to the national grid in the future, it can sell excess electricity from the daytime
(the river is still flowing after all) back to NEA, providing an extra source of income for
the village, or possibly a back-up fund for maintaining and repairing the hydropower
machinery. This scale of micro hydropower gives an idea of the unnecessarily vast
disparity in size of hydropower projects. If 15 kW can provide even 75 families with
basic electricity, than 15 MW projects (which are still considered tiny by the Big Dam
model) can be expected to power close to 75,000 households! This extrapolation could
certainly have a high possibility for error, due to different energy needs in households
and the vastly magnified need for electricity in industry. However, the observed point is
that funding many small-scale projects can add up to the same amount of power provided
by one Big Dam, without tying up all of Nepal’s resources in one project or wreaking
havoc on the environment.
Through interviews with villagers and the micro-hydro operator and manager, I
learned that Simigaau’s micro-hydro was built about ten years ago (in 2001). Appealing
to the government for funding through the rural electrification program and getting the
site assessed took four years. The project has cost 27 lakh (2.7 million Nepali rupees, or
approximately $35,000) to date. Its original cost was only 19 lakh, in grant from the
Remote Area Development Committee (RADC). However, an additional 8 lakh had to be
reapplied for, through pestering the government endlessly, to get money for replacement
parts after a lightning storm rendered the original machinery useless. The villagers
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themselves used the grant money to buy all the equipment from Nepal’s Butwal Power
Company, a corporation with a 40-year track record of funding “multi faceted capacity
building initiatives in hydropower development” (Butwal Power Company, 2012). Now
the responsibility for running and paying for the hydropower is entirely Simigaau’s
responsibility. Each household in the village pays 20 rupees each month for each
lightbulb (approximately the value of a U.S. quarter). The hydropower operator receives
2000 rupees per month so there is no money left over from villagers’ payments for a
reserve fund in case the machine ever breaks again. Simigaau has been more than lucky
to receive government assistance, not once but twice, and could probably not apply for
more.
The villagers were devoted and persistent in their goal of getting electricity for
their village. At the onset each family contributed a large sum of 700 rupees, along with
fifteen days of ‘shramdaan’ (donated labor) from each family and two cubic meters of
collected rock, for building the powerhouse. All together, this significant contribution
from the villagers still amounted to less than the expected 20 percent of the total cost, but
the government subsidized the rest of the cost. The whole system took six months to
build: two engineers from Kathmandu came to advise the building process and they ran
the powerhouse for the first six months. Other than these two men, Simigaau villagers
contributed all the labor for this project. After each family’s fifteen days of ‘shramdaan’,
the villagers were paid a small pittance for their work: two months of labor earned each
family 2000 rupees. The fact that they were paid at all may seem like an extra benefit,
since the hydropower was already for their village. However, the labor required to build
the powerhouse detracted valuable time from their fields, and most of Simigaau’s
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villagers depend upon subsistence farming. The lone hydropower operator in Simigaau
received 45 days of training in Kathmandu. The single other knowledgeable person in the
village, who often fixes wires and outlets, never had any formal ‘bijuli’ (electricity)
training. This handyman offered me his opinion on their project willingly: small hydropower projects work better (“saphal bhayo”) because they need less money, are easier
and faster to build, and can be managed locally. Nepal’s politicians are still struggling to
understand this simple conclusion, which the villagers of Simigaau know implicitly from
having observed the success of the method in their own village. As small and isolated as
Simigaau is- only a fraction of the larger picture of hydropower in Nepal- sharing this
small village’s struggle to build a micro-hydropower project provides a personal
perspective to understand the magnitude of the problem that almost 18 million people in
Nepal (60 percent of the population) have no access to electricity. Furthermore this case
study attests to the success of community management in the hydro-sector.
This brief history of NACEUN and the success of the 80/20 funding plan in
building micro-hydro projects demonstrates that Nepal has the resources to supply its vast
rural population with power. Moreover, when decision-makers have their heads on
straight and look out for the public good, a lot can get done in a short amount of time. To
further my argument that Nepal does not need to rely on international funding to further
its hydro-development goals, the next two case studies explain how Nepal can
domestically fund and build hydropower at scales beyond the community level. One is a
mid-size project currently under construction by the private hydropower company,
Synergy, called the Siprin Khola Hydroelectric. The last case study is an example of a
new breed of Big Dam through all Nepali funding: from companies, the government, and
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public shares. This 456MW Tamakhosi project is in the process of being built on a river
of the same name, above the village of Simigaau and Synergy’s Siprin Khola project.

•

Siprin Khola: A case of private sector participation

The Siprin Khola Hydroelectric is a medium-scale run-of-the-river hydropower
project. While it contributes a sizeable quantity of electricity to the national grid, it
doesn’t displace thousands of people because of its size or involve a reservoir that would
necessitate flooding a populated valley. The 9.6 MW project is located along the
Tamakhosi River that flows in the steep valley below Simigaau, between Jagat and
Singati (the closest major town to Simigaau). In May 2011, I met an engineer for the
Siprin Khola project in Singati who strongly believed that including the private sector is
one of the best ways to build local capacity for development (through backward linkages)
and build more hydropower, quickly. In the case of the Siprin Khola project, engineers
laid plans for a year, received their license through the Department of Electricty
Development (DoED), and have been constructing for a year. When we met in May of
2011, there were only six months left until the powerhouse would be ready to supply
electricity. Funding for the project included 30 percent of the developer’s money, while
70 percent in the form of a loan from the Sanima Bikas Bank. The involvement of
multiple groups is one integral reason for keeping hydropower production within Nepal.
Not only Synergy, but also every industry they buy materials from, the labor, and the loan
all boost Nepal’s economy. The total cost of the project is two ‘arab’ (2 billion rupees, or
$28 million U.S.), which is cheaper than the equivalent cost of a project built without
outside contractors, materials and loans.

Berry

91

The importance of the private sector in Nepal’s hydropower development is clearly
visible in history. It took Nepal 86 years since its first hydropower project (-1996) to get
300 MW of hydropower capacity built. Then, in under a decade, because of a policy shift
following the restoration of multi-party democracy in 1990 that allowed the addition of
the private sector and community sector into the hydro-building business, another 300
MW was installed. In the last decade, however, few substantial projects have reached
completion, though many projects are in the planning stages or supposedly under
construction. Private sector companies, despite their success rate in doubling Nepal’s
hydropower capacity, face a political roadblock because the government still prefers
giving contracts to international companies. I can’t speak to why this is, when the
international contractors’ profits will go to their own economies, not Nepal’s, but these
are the facts. In 1997 the government announced a buy-back rate from Nepal’s private
power producers that was, at the time, lower than what the government offered to Indian
companies (D. Gyawali, Interview, May 2011). Certainly the buy-back rate needs
changing now, more than a decade later; the rate still hangs at four rupees per unit of
electricity even though the government willingly pays Indian companies seven rupees per
unit (R.S. Shrestha, Interview, May 2011).
If policy changes were made to not only support rich private sector businesses but to
include laypeople with small shares, the money in the private sector could continue to
grow. “To date the private sector contributes about 30 percent of annual electrical energy
supplied by the national electricity grid” (Subarna Das Shrestha cited in Bisht, 2010).
Currently, Kali gandaki A (144MW capacity) is the largest project to be completed in
Nepal but Nepal’s greatest goal is quite a leap larger: the Karnali-Chisapani project, at an
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estimated 10,800 MW, will be the biggest dam if it is ever built (Independent Power
Producers Association Nepal (IPPAN), n.d.).

•

Upper Tamakhosi: A domestically-funded Big Dam
Further up the Tamakhosi River from the Siprin Khola project lie the beginnings

of the first entirely nationally funded mega-project. The Upper Tamakhosi project has a
planned capacity of 456 MW for the national grid, which will be the biggest project in
Nepal upon its completion. The dam is a public sector government project, with funding
from NEA, Nepal Telecom, the civil servants Provident Fund, and local IPO (which are
public shares that anyone can invest in), among others. Ten percent of the total shares in
the dam go automatically to Dolakha district so that the local people will profit from the
project. Other projects of this magnitude have never gotten off the ground: licensing or
funding issues, politicians interested in kickbacks, not to mention local demands, always
stymied progress. But Gokunda Bishta, Nepal’s current energy minister can be credited
for recently beginning construction on the Upper Tamakhosi. Not only is the road to the
project (built by a Chinese company) under construction, so is the actual ground site for
the dam. As exciting as it will be for Nepal to finance and support a project of its own of
this magnitude, it’s hard to imagine how many people will be displaced to make room for
a dam of Tamakhosi’s size. Hopefully, domestic management, transparency in the
project’s planning and implementation and the inclusion of local people in the investment
and returns from this mega-dam will lead to more follow through in re-settlement of
affected villages.
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Lessons and changes to be made
After so much discussion in the previous chapters on the obstacles to progress and
many shortfalls of foreign aid-funded Big Dams, we can now turn to the shining light at
the end of the tunnel: hydropower in Nepal is by no means a dead end, and its increasing
success with the nation-led development approach highlights possibilities for other
developing countries. The Simigaau and Siprin Khola Hydroelectric case studies provide
alternatives to the ‘Big’ model of Western hydropower development, focusing on scale of
projects. If large dams remain necessary to fulfill electricity demands from large cities
and irrigation needs for agriculture, the larger Tamakhosi project is an example of how
large-scale hydropower can most benefit the state’s economy, by relying on sovereign
means for development.
There are endless possibilities to further change the construction paradigm and take
action to relieve Nepal’s power shortage burden. The first change Nepal can make is to
accept the importance of plurality in decision-making (both on policy and project
choices). To make wise choices for hydropower development, Nepal needs its
government (for checks and balances), it needs the private sector (to build big enough for
the national grid and provide an arena for investment), and it needs community (to
represent the public’s interests). Cultural theorists assert that monism and dualism don’t
work in functioning democratic societies: pluralism is what allows the public, private,
community, and activists to act as a whole, and the egalitarian voice (from informed
activists) is the only thing that has currently stopped Nepal’s government from handing
out project licenses to any international company that comes around with a big enough
bribe.
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The second promising field for Nepal’s hydropower circuit is how much Nepali
investment can be put into hydropower if only the means are made available. Remittance2
coming from abroad every year is 300 billion rupees (R.S. Shrestha, Interview, May
2011). Only 10 percent of that giant figure is 30 billion rupees. Ratna Sansar Shrestha
(the leading source in Nepali media for hydropower economics) says that with one third
equity and two thirds in loans, Nepal could build 900 MW of hydropower every year on
that amount, with Nepali investment through Nepali companies! Nepal is not a destitute
nation: a lack of policy framework that could allow Nepali investors to participate is what
is sorely missing- not the money to invest in hydropower. The public shares available for
the Tamakhosi project could be the beginning of institutionalizing a way within the
government for the public to participate in hydropower development.
Initiating policy framework falls under a need for a change in management style:
Nepal can redirect efforts from "project construction to water management" (Gyawali,
2001, p. 8). With this paradigm change will come a logical shift in focus toward
community management. While NEA will have to relinquish some of its control, the facts
show distinctly how "community participation and ownership brought about dramatic
reductions in the construction costs of water resource projects" (Gyawali, 2001, p. 10). It
costs NEA and the World Bank $300/household for rural electrification while it only
costs NACEUN $99/house (D. Gyawali, Interview, May 2011; D. Ghimire, Interview,
May 2011). Through NACEUN, management groups don’t have to be registered as
electricity groups: they can be a mother’s group, or forest management group which
makes room for all the people without bureaucratic qualifications who care about their
2

Remittance is a certain amount of money sent home to families from citizens working
abroad that is taxed by the government
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communities to be involved in electricity management. Kunda Dixit drew my attention to
a wider range of community management successes: “everything that has worked in
Nepal since 1990 has ‘community management’, including irrigation, forestry,
healthcare, education, and electricity” (K. Dixit, Interview, May 2011).
A big price motivation for handing over electricity management to communities is
reducing theft: “simple institutional tinkering in early 2003, which introduced double
accounting with bulk supply separated from retain, has brought down the loss figure to
nine percent from over three times that amount. Implemented nation-wide, such a
measure would free up electricity equivalent to our largest power plant, the Kali Gandaki,
for use by genuine paying consumers.” (Gyawali, 2010a, n.p.) Mugling is one small town
that now buys electricity from NEA in bulk. After adding this double accounting step,
loss dropped from 36 percent to 9 percent in Mugling and citizens have been using the
extra electricity to start businesses and refrigerate valuable medicines (Mahato, 2010).
Even currently foreign-run projects can be handed over to municipalities to manage:
Dhulikhel and Kumbu are successful examples of foreign-built hydropower that are now
being successfully run by local communities (D. Gyawali, Interview, May 2011). The
basic point is that the process of communitisation is key in getting more electricity to
rural people- a method that can be used in any other country and in other development
arenas, such as for forestry and agriculture.
The real reason for focusing on communitisation is to “get away from the romance
of generation, [the] real problems lie in distribution” (D. Gyawali, Interview, May 2011).
Since electricity can't be saved, the focus has to start from distribution, not generation,
and must hold NEA accountable for lost electricity and theft. The trick is
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decentralization: "if you can separate things, they become easier to manage” (B.
Tulandhar, Interview, May 2011). The government needs to pressure NEA to dissolve its
monopoly at least into separate generation, transmission, and distribution companies
(calling for accountability, checks and balances, and decrease in leaks and theft).
To make and enforce such a decision as decentralizing Nepal’s power conglomerate
will require strong, accountable leadership. Nepal is not historically bereft of such
leaders: King Ganendra put knowledgeable technocrats as his ministers to increase
accountability (e.g. a neurosurgeon as Health Minister). Nepal needs responsible leaders
who have their motherland’s interests at heart above their own. The difficult part is, most
experts in water management, fighting for the common good of Nepal, are so turned off
by the corruption they witness in politics that they would never think to join the
government. Dilli Ghimire, for example, with the help of his friends and political
connections, got 142 amendments added to the “Electricity Act” (2009) for community
management, distribution and de-monopolizing NEA, and separating rural electrification
programs from NEA. This is a huge leap from the first draft of the bill (in ’92 or ’93),
which focused on the development of hydropower and export to India, and how to bring
in international investors. NACEUN’s goals for the bill now include: anyone who wants
to participate in hydropower development (whatever their investment capacity) should
have a mechanism within the government to do so; Nepali people can have ownership
and also benefit from buying shares. The amendments put consumers first, saying that
priority should be given to consumers in Nepal before export is considered, and the tariff
process needs to be transparent, which requires consumer participation. The bill calls for
not only a break up of the NEA monopoly but requires that rural electrification should be
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separate from NEA entirely (so it is not commercially viable and cannot be promoted by
a business entity) because it is a social concern. NACEUN was able to put through these
amendments by inviting ministers to share in their meetings in 2009 and calling over and
over again, pressuring the government through all their connections. With 142
amendments, it’s now the most amended bill in the history of Nepal. That’s the kind of
leadership and initiative with the potential for great success in changing the construction
paradigm in hydropower planning in Nepal.
Nepal can also make changes, at the government level, to welcome foreign
investment with more caution and care. One example of a current joint project that could
be better tailored to benefit Nepal is the 900 MW Upper Karnali project. Under the
current contract, Nepal will only receive twelve percent of the produced energy, while the
rest is exported for India’s use. However, GMR, the Indian company currently licensed to
construct the Upper Karnali project, is just a contractor. If Nepal acts intelligently, it
could draw up a new contract and insist that all the hydropower from the Upper Karnali
project go to Nepal, while still letting GMR build the dam (R.S. Shrestha, Interview, May
2011). Returns on financial investments are the main concern of foreign contractors, so
the perceived risk that Indian companies will back out immediately when Nepal does not
offer India the majority of the benefits is false. Activists insist that it’s possible, if Nepal
is smart and stops saying, “YES” to every foreign company’s first offer, to have Indian
investment without export.
Nepal can make it clear that it won’t say yes to every offer by saying to investors:
“we’ll guarantee your return and your security” (which is more than Nepal has done so
far), “but you have to sell all of the electricity to us at the same price that you would have
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exported it to India.” This is not an unreasonable demand, but of course if Nepal is
willing to settle for less (which it historically has), than why wouldn’t Indian contractors
take advantage of Nepal’s poor decisions to benefit their own motherland. One example
where Nepal could have been more circumspect in accepting foreign aid is the Middle
Marsyangdi project, which is now costing $10,000/kW. The government should have
been more careful about the contract: Ratna Sansar Shrestha—who was in the cabinet
picked by Dipak Gyawali when he was minister of water resources—saw the present
problems coming and offered a way out, an opportunity to drop the contract and rewrite it
carefully. Unfortunately, the prime minister in power was too afraid of backlash from the
bureaucracy if he dropped such a prestigious hydropower contract. Important things to
keep in mind in discussions on incorporating foreign involvement are that in small
projects, backward linkages are more important: they can give jobs to Nepalis since local
factories have the capacity to build turbines up to 2-3 MW. In big projects, backward
linkages are negligible because Nepal doesn’t have the capacity to build and maintain
large hydropower yet, so forward linkages become the only thing worth building for.
Therefore, it cannot be stressed enough that electricity has to stay in Nepal in order to
develop Nepal’s industrial capacity.
Each of the lessons to take away from Nepal’s experiences in nation-led
hydropower development are tools that can be applied in other developing countries.
Utilizing community management for small-scale development projects, adjusting
government policy to include participatory mechanisms for investment, and embracing
pluralism in decision-making can help developing nations in the Global South rely less
on foreign aid. Independent of foreign aid, developing countries can choose to forgo the
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homogenizing modernization model and replace it with locally adapted, human-centric
development techniques. Community management, participatory investment, and
pluralism all entail levels of cooperative decision-making that are foreign to the top-down
Western development model. Each of these development tools allow for local knowledge
input to adapt development projects to scale, peculiarities of environments, and disparate
cultures.
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Chapter V: Conclusion
This paper has covered a host of topics in attempting to prove that sovereign
development, across multiple scales, results in positive development that focuses on local
needs and capacity building. It illuminated the negative effects foreign aid can have on
developing countries through sharing the evolution of modernization theory and common
critiques of the Western development model. While Big Dams have become a symbol of
progress and development all over the world, the section exploring the consequences of
large-scale hydropower development revealed how the singular focus on building big has
had disastrous impacts on the environment and rural poor of developing countries.
Focusing specifically on case of hydropower development in Nepal provided context and
examples for why foreign aid, tied integrally to other countries’ agendas, can stymie
domestic development. Finally, the last chapter on alternative development options for
nation-led hydropower development in Nepal illustrated how developing countries
already have the tools for independent development, and can break the destructive cycle
of dependence on foreign aid. Utilizing local knowledge and labor, local materials, and
domestic finances for development provides all possible benefits, from backward and
forward linkages, to the developing country rather than conflating benefits with other
countries, as the foreign aid-dependent Western model of development does.
The reasons the Western Development model has failed to bring true humancentric development to developing countries are inherent in its goal to impose one
approach to development in every country, regardless of vast differences in history,
culture, and place. The Western development model is born on the modernization
principles that all societies must abandon their traditions in order to progress toward
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becoming homogenized, ‘Americanized’, mass-consumer states. Aside from the fact that
not all nations want this future, the illogical idea that every country in the world can
modernize with the same five-step process first introduced by Rostow, has led to an
insurmountable cycle of debt and dependence on foreign aid in developing countries.
Because foreign aid often focuses on donor agendas more than developing countries’
needs, rates success of projects based on money delivered rather than observed effects at
the local level, and procreates the same ‘cookie cutter’ style projects that worked in the
West, top-down, large-scale development projects built with foreign aid are ignorant of
human needs and destructive to local people’s livelihoods and the environment. How
could any model predicated on notions of completely remaking distinct cultures into
homogenized replicas of the West pay heed to the needs of individual nations, much less
communities?
Instead, the Western development model has led to the continued exploitation of
developing countries’ resources for the benefit of the Global North through neoliberal
‘free market policies’. Western developed countries, through the mouthpiece of their
international finance institutions, have imposed liberalization policies to deregulate
protectionist measures in the Third World in exchange for development loans.
Developing countries lose two for two under this model: neoliberal policies concentrate
wealth in the hands of the few at the expense of the poor, while large development loans
tie up all the host country’s resources in a few projects and undermine locally adapted
techniques by imposing Western technology. Thus, foreign aid has worsened problems of
scarcity (most dangerously in agricultural and water resource sectors) and actually pulled
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the underdeveloped countries of the Global South a step back in their attempts to reduce
poverty and raise living standards.
Critics of this mainstream model advocate for developing countries of the Global
South to de-link from trade relationships with the West in order to break the cycle of
neocolonial exploitation. They suggest eliminating the entire concept of ‘Third World’
because it maintains unequal power dynamics. Without arbitrary connotations of what
constitutes ‘progress’ and ‘development’ versus ‘backwardness’, the developing world
would be released from the pressure to conform to the West’s modernization model. The
cut and paste model propagated by the West cannot work because the developed
countries of the Global North were never ‘underdeveloped’— their own industrial
development was predicated on extracting the resources of colonized countries, who are
now left worse off because of contact with the West.
The specific problems resulting from Big Dam development are integrally related
to the Western development model’s exclusive focus on large-scale development through
foreign aid. Dams have proven their usefulness in providing irrigation, preventing floods
and producing a source of valuable electricity—so the problem is not that all dams are
destructive for development—but that the Western approach to dam building ignores and
covers up problems that could be fixed by focusing directly on the needs of local people
and being open to different scales of hydropower development. Western development’s
approach to dam building lacks responsibility in properly addressing environmental
impacts and the risks to local people affected and displaced by dams. It is guilty of
exaggerating the potential benefits of dam projects and underestimating the costs in order
to convince developing countries that large loans tied to specific projects are in their best
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interest. Worst of all, this model cannot (and barely attempts to) follow through on its
promise that Big Dam development will spur industrialization, reduce famines through
increased irrigation potential, and provide clean drinking water in underdeveloped areas.
All of these negatives effects of foreign aid are apparent in Nepal’s history of
hydropower development, where India is the foreign actor whose agenda is primarily
served by building large-scale dam projects. The general pattern is one of unequal treaties
for joint Indo-Nepal projects, where Indian companies generously offer to fund giant
hydropower projects in Nepal- but also demand most of the benefits. Political infighting
in Nepal and corrupt leaders looking for kickbacks give licenses too willingly to Indian
companies, insisting that India’s superior development capacity is key to Nepal’s
hydropower development.
The vital missing link to understand why India developing Nepal’s water
resources won’t boost Nepal’s economic development is in the nation-led development
idea of backward and forward linkages. Projects built mainly for exporting energy or
water to India relinquish opportunities for forward linkages to boost Nepal’s
development. The economic revenue gained from selling project rights to India won’t
spur domestic development the way retaining the electricity to improve Nepal’s own
industrial sector would, or the way retaining regulated water for Nepal’s use could
improve the agricultural production of the country. Moreover allowing foreign
contractors and foreign aid to drive development decisions leaves Nepal as little more
than a passive observer of its own resource development. Thus, Nepal surrenders all
opportunities for backward linkages from increased employment, experience for Nepali
engineers, use of Nepali banks, and material supplies from its own industries.
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The sovereign development methods gaining momentum in Nepal today ensure

that the country receives benefits from both backward and forward linkages in its
hydropower development projects. While this case study is understandably limited—
Community management techniques, policies for participatory investment, and pluralism
in the decision-making process are methods for sovereign-led development that can be
extrapolated to other arenas of development and other countries. The central lesson is that
successful nation-led development projects, whether at the small-scale community level
or large-scale state level, are human-centric in addressing local needs, incorporating local
knowledge, and encouraging participation from all levels of society. As it turns out, the
big picture of successful Global South development necessitates focusing on the small, as
the overall development of any nation depends on the quality of life it can offer its
individual citizens. The nation-led development model supported here allows room for
each individual to play a role in deciding the unique development path of their country.
With further attention paid to these local capacity building methods, the future of the
world need not be a reflection of one homogenized consumer culture or even a
continuation of the current global hierarchy of First World over Third World. Nation-led
development can lead to a world where eventually, the terms ‘colonization’ and
‘underdeveloped’ may only exist in history books.
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